An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

Maximization Multiplicity (mathematics) Finite set Solution set Solution concept
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0208-6 Publication Date: 2005-10-26T10:04:48Z
ABSTRACT
Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent.A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games.The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ.Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article.
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