The evolution of host manipulation by parasites: a game theory analysis

• DOI: 10.1007/s10682-009-9334-0
• Publication Date: 2009-11-06T06:38:53Z
• Authors: William L. Vickery; Robert Poulin
• Keywords: Competitor analysis; Animal ecology; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Free riding; Investment

Many parasites are known to manipulate the behaviour of intermediate hosts in order to increase their probability of transmission to definitive hosts. This manipulation must have costs. Here we explore the combined effects of three such costs on the amount of effort a parasite should expend on host manipulation. Manipulation can have direct costs to future reproductive success due to energy expended to manipulate the host. There may also be indirect costs if other parasites infect the host and profit from the manipulation without paying the cost of manipulation. These “free riders” may impose a third cost by competing with manipulators for resources within the host. Using game theory analysis and several different competition models we show that intrahost competition will decrease the investment that a parasite should make in manipulation but that manipulation can, under some circumstances, be a profitable strategy even in the presence of non-manipulating competitors. The key determinants of the manipulator’s success and its investment in manipulation are the relatedness among parasites within the host, the ratio of the passive transmission rate to the efficiency of increasing transmission rate and the strength of competitive effects. Manipulation, when exploited by others, becomes an altruistic behaviour. Thus we suggest that our model may be generally applicable to cases where organisms can exploit the investment of others (possibly kin) while also competing with the organism whose investment they exploit.