Natural kinds and dispositions: a causal analysis

• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02184-y
• Publication Date: 2019-03-27T16:38:33Z
• Authors: Robert van Rooij; Katrin Schulz
• Keywords: Ascription; Quine; Disposition; Philosophy of language; Natural kind

Abstract Objects have dispositions. Dispositions are normally analyzed by providing a meaning to disposition ascriptions like ‘This piece of salt is soluble’. Philosophers Carnap, Goodman, Quine, Lewis and many others proposed analyses such ascriptions. In this paper we will argue with Quine (‘Natural Kinds’, 1970) that the proper analysis form ‘ x disposed m (when C)’, where ’ denotes an object, manifestation, C condition, goes this: (i) natural kind k ’, (ii) generic s C)’ true. For generic, propose in terms causal powers: C) power ’. The latter, turn, very precise way, making use Pearl’s probabilistic graphical models. We show how kind-analysis improves on standard conditional dispositions avoiding counterexamples, it gives rise observable criteria under which ascription