Evolutionary game analysis of coal enterprise resource integration under government regulation

• DOI: 10.1007/s11356-021-15503-z
• Publication Date: 2021-09-01T20:02:42Z
• Authors: Ziyuan Sun; Wei Wang; Weixing Zhu; Lin Ma; Yuting Dong; Jiangwei Lu
• Keywords: China; Coal; Game Theory; 13. Climate action; Government; 8. Economic growth; Government Regulation; 0211 other engineering and technologies; 02 engineering and technology; Environmental Pollution; 7. Clean energy

Abstract Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. Results demonstrate that:(1) when the power gap between enterprises is great, government regulations are not effective for inferior enterprises;(2) the combination of government regulation can help to improve the efficiency of coal enterprise strategy selection;(3) excessive government regulations make the strategic choices of the government and coal enterprise tend to swing, failing to achieve effectively resource integration and government supervision.