Evolution of Cooperation in Multiplex Networks

Temptation Multiplex Interdependent networks Resilience Evolutionary Dynamics Social dilemma
DOI: 10.1038/srep00620 Publication Date: 2012-08-31T09:16:06Z
ABSTRACT
We study evolutionary game dynamics on structured populations in which individuals take part several layers of networks interactions simultaneously. This multiplex interdependent accounts for the different kind social ties each individual has. By coupling a Prisoner's Dilemma networks, we show that resilience cooperative behaviors extremely large values temptation to defect is enhanced by structure. Furthermore, this intrinsically related non-trivial organization cooperation across network layers, thus providing new way out survive populations.
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