Evolution of Cooperation in Multiplex Networks
Temptation
Multiplex
Interdependent networks
Resilience
Evolutionary Dynamics
Social dilemma
DOI:
10.1038/srep00620
Publication Date:
2012-08-31T09:16:06Z
AUTHORS (4)
ABSTRACT
We study evolutionary game dynamics on structured populations in which individuals take part several layers of networks interactions simultaneously. This multiplex interdependent accounts for the different kind social ties each individual has. By coupling a Prisoner's Dilemma networks, we show that resilience cooperative behaviors extremely large values temptation to defect is enhanced by structure. Furthermore, this intrinsically related non-trivial organization cooperation across network layers, thus providing new way out survive populations.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Coming soon ....
REFERENCES (46)
CITATIONS (360)
EXTERNAL LINKS
PlumX Metrics
RECOMMENDATIONS
FAIR ASSESSMENT
Coming soon ....
JUPYTER LAB
Coming soon ....