Bribery: Behavioral Drivers of Distorted Decisions
Reciprocity
Limiting
Self-interest
Scope (computer science)
DOI:
10.1093/jeea/jvy043
Publication Date:
2018-11-24T08:42:50Z
AUTHORS (3)
ABSTRACT
We experimentally investigate behavioral drivers of bribery, focusing on the role self-interest, reciprocity, and moral costs associated with distorting judgment. In our laboratory experiment, two participants compete for a prize; referee picks winner. Participants can bribe referee. When keep only winner's bribe, bribes distort her keeps regardless winner, no longer influence decision. An experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. These findings imply that are influenced by out not because desire to reciprocate. Further evidence shows self-interest guides decisions greater extent when referees have scope avoiding As result, limiting referees' ability form self-serving evaluations significantly reduce effectiveness bribes.
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