Indirect exclusion can promote cooperation in repeated group interactions

• DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2022.0290
• Publication Date: 2022-07-27T07:05:59Z
• Authors: Linjie Liu; Xiaojie Chen
• Keywords: Public goods game; Dominance (genetics); Social dilemma; Social Exclusion; Value (mathematics); Evolutionary Dynamics

Social exclusion has been regarded as one of the most effective measures to promote evolution cooperation. In real society, way in which social works can be direct or indirect. However, thus far there is no related work explore how indirect influences cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we introduce into repeated public goods game where organizer probabilistically selects cooperators after first round participate following possible interactions. We then investigate evolutionary dynamics both infinite and finite well-mixed populations. Through analysis numerical calculations, find that introduction induce stable coexistence defectors dominance cooperators, effectively promotes Besides, show identifying probability nonlinear effect on when its value lower than an intermediate value, while higher maintain high level Furthermore, our results increasing average rounds interactions