Fraud Power Laws
Materiality
Punishment (psychology)
Earnings Management
DOI:
10.1111/1475-679x.12520
Publication Date:
2023-12-30T19:28:07Z
AUTHORS (3)
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose theoretical mechanism explains such relatively high frequency extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor uncertain quality can detect and punish manager. As fails to fraud, manager's posterior belief about monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, learning leads slippery slope, in which size frauds grows steeply, power law fraud. Empirical analyses corroborate slope channel. policy implication, establish higher detection intensity increase by enabling identify an ineffective more quickly. Further, nondetection below materiality threshold, paired with sufficiently steep punishment scheme, prevent large
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Coming soon ....
REFERENCES (69)
CITATIONS (5)
EXTERNAL LINKS
PlumX Metrics
RECOMMENDATIONS
FAIR ASSESSMENT
Coming soon ....
JUPYTER LAB
Coming soon ....