Exploiting Determinism in Lattice-based Signatures
Fault injection
NIST
Post-quantum cryptography
Signature (topology)
DOI:
10.1145/3321705.3329821
Publication Date:
2019-07-09T12:53:20Z
AUTHORS (5)
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the implementation level fault vulnerabilities of deterministic lattice-based signature schemes. particular, extend practicality skip-addition attacks through exploitation determinism in Dilithium and qTESLA schemes, which are two leading candidates for NIST standardization post-quantum cryptography. We show that single targeted faults injected signing procedure allow to recover an important portion secret key. Though do not all key elements, propose a novel forgery algorithm allows attacker sign any given message with only extracted perform experimental validation our attack using Electromagnetic injection on reference implementations taken from pqm4 library, benchmarking testing framework post quantum cryptographic ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. also break well known countermeasures protect against attacks. further efficient mitigation strategy exponentially increases attacker's complexity at almost zero increase computational complexity.
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