Cooperative Stackelberg game based optimal allocation and pricing mechanism in crowdsensing

• DOI: 10.1504/ijsnet.2018.094696
• Publication Date: 2018-09-13T11:30:17Z
• Authors: Chunchi Liu; Rong Du; Shengling Wang; Rongfang Bie
• Keywords: Stackelberg competition; Budget constraint; Crowdsensing

Crowdsensing has been earning increasing credits for effectively integrating the mass sensors to achieve significant tasks that one single sensor cannot imagine. However in many existing works this field, some key information of participants is incomplete each other, hence causing non-optimality result. Noticing a potential cooperation between players, we propose cooperative Stackelberg game based optimal task allocation and pricing mechanism crowdsensing scenario. Aiming at different optimising criteria, two games are either with no budget constraint (No-Budget OpSt Game) or (Budget-Feasible Game). Analysis their corresponding Equilibrium then presented. Lastly, perform extensive simulations test impact parameters on our model. Results proposed progressively compared show optimisations respective criteria.