Political Influence on Non-Cooperative International Climate Policy

• DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1920210
• Publication Date: 2012-01-05T12:52:32Z
• Authors: Ralph Winkler; Wolfgang Habla
• Keywords: emissions trading; H23; jel:H41; Nationalismus; Internationale Umweltpolitik; jel:H23; 7. Clean energy; political economy; organization of interest groups; D72; Interessenpolitik; 0502 economics and business; non-cooperative climate policy; Emissionshandel; ddc:330; 05 social sciences; jel:D72; 330 Economics; Q58; Neue politische Ökonomie; non-cooperative climate policy; political economy; emissions trading; organization; 13. Climate action; environmental awareness; H41; jel:Q58; Internationale Zusammenarbeit

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported all countries. second non-cooperatively on number tradable or non-tradable allowances, depending type regime. both stages, special groups try sway government their favor. find that (i) choice regime and level aggregate emissions depend levels organized stakes not distribution among individual groups, (ii) increase lobbying influence particular lobby group may backfire inducing change towards less preferred