This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analyzing how impacts upon incentive selection effects, thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so that absent elections, voters are indifferent about regime. effect centralization welfare works through two channels: (i) via its probability pooling bad incumbent; (ii) conditional pooling, extent to which, with...

Abstract We describe the points system as proposed by Belgian Commission for Pension Reform 2020–2040. Intragenerational equity can be realised through allocation of within a cohort. The intergenerational distribution is determined fixing value point newly retired and sustainability parameter actual retirees. links pensions to average living standard employed population. propose an automatic adjustment mechanism, in which key role played career length. This mechanism induces balanced burden...

After a very rapid economic boom in the sixties, due to installation of Pacific Testing Centre and construction airports Tahiti its islands, French Polynesia experienced an almost continuous decline growth during next four decades, before plunging into depression since 2009.This research analyses factors (labour, capital intensity, human capital, total factor productivity) over period 1960-2006, after reconstituting long consistent series variables studied compares them with metropolitan...

Abstract We analyse the impact of unequal school opportunity on intergenerational income mobility and human capital accumulation. Building upon classical Becker–Tomes–Solon framework, we use a regime-switch model allowing for differences in transmission across groups. find that raises average because assortative matching. However, dispersion tends to be higher at top, most cases decreases mobility. Calibrating USA, simulations suggest equalisation desegregation policies have positive effects...

There is widespread concern that greater mobility of individuals can undermine any attempt to redistribute income at the local level. In this paper we derive equilibrium level redistribution when both rich and poor are imperfectly mobile each jurisdiction chooses its redistributive policy by majority voting. This leads a fundamental interaction whereby choices jurisdictions determine whom they attract where determines their choices. Our main findings twofold. First, show increase amount...

It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although takes form unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. also are less likely be provided in larger groups. only qualification our results when probability so high it a dominant strategy for all egoistic players ride. In this case, actually, both and group facilitate good provision.