Reciprocity and repeated games have been at the center of attention when studying evolution human cooperation. Direct reciprocity is considered to be a powerful mechanism for cooperation, it generally assumed that can lead high levels Here we explore an open-ended, infinite strategy space, where every encoded by finite state automaton possible mutant. Surprisingly, find direct alone does not Instead observe perpetual oscillations between cooperation defection, with defection being...

In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak approximations, which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether under are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” mean ranking strategies induced an process does not change...

Abstract The study of evolutionary dynamics increasingly relies on computational methods, as more and cases outside the range analytical tractability are explored. methods for simulation numerical approximation relevant quantities diverging without being compared accuracy performance. We thoroughly investigate these algorithms in order to propose a reliable standard. For expositional clarity we focus symmetric 2 × games leading one-dimensional processes, noting that extensions can be...

Computer simulations are regularly used for studying the evolution of strategies in repeated games. These rarely pay attention to game theoretical results that can illuminate data analysis or questions being asked. Results from evolutionary theory imply every Nash equilibrium, there sequences mutants would destabilise them. If not limited a finite set, populations move between variety equilibria with different levels cooperation. This instability is inescapable, regardless how represented....

The emergence and maintenance of punishment to protect the commons remains an open puzzle in social biological sciences. Even societies where pro-social punishing is common, some individuals seek cheat system if they see a chance do so—and public goods are often maintained spite cheaters who not contribute. We present model accounting for all possible strategies game with punishment. While most models restrict set behaviours, excluding seemingly paradoxical anti-social from start, we show...

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e., if there strategies a single mutation can result any strategy with probability . However, biological systems it seems natural not arise from given state. Certain may be far away, or even unreachable the current composition of an evolving population. These distances between (or genotypes) define topology so has been neglected evolutionary theory. In this paper we re-evaluate classic results...

Abstract The emergence of cooperation in decentralized multi-agent systems is challenging; naive implementations learning algorithms typically fail to converge or equilibria without cooperation. Opponent modeling techniques, combined with reinforcement learning, have been successful promoting cooperation, but face challenges when other agents are plentiful anonymous. We envision environments which a sequence interactions different and heterogeneous agents. Inspired by models evolutionary...

Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games assume that there an exogenous probability with which every interaction repeated. If it sufficiently likely interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation can evolve together in prisoner’s dilemmas. Who individuals interact however also be under their control, or at least some degree. we change model so allows terminate current partner, find someone else play dilemmas...

Abstract Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue that requires holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution “technocognitive” approach, involving synthesis of psychological computer science research. Psychological research has identified interventions counter misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) technique-based explanations misleading techniques logical fallacies)...

Social insects are among the ecologically most successful collectively living organisms, with efficient division of labour a key feature this success. Surprisingly, these colonies often have large proportion inactive workers in their workforce, sometimes referred to as

Abstract We model the impact of different incentives on journal behavior in undertaking peer review. Under one scheme, aims to publish highest-quality papers; under second, maintain a high rejection rate. both schemes, journals prefer set very standards for acceptance despite allowing significant error second however, order encourage more submissions mediocre papers, is incentivized make its editorial process less accurate. This leads worse review and lower-quality articles being published.

Abstract Social insects allocate their workforce in a decentralised fashion, addressing multiple tasks and responding effectively to environmental changes. This process is fundamental ecological success, but the mechanisms behind it are not well understood. While most models focus on internal individual factors, empirical evidence highlights importance of ecology social interactions. To address this gap, we propose game theoretical model task allocation. Our main findings twofold: Firstly,...

In this paper a stopping criterion for particular class of evolutionary algorithms is devised. First, model generic algorithm using iterated random maps presented. The allows the exploration connection between coupling from past, and algorithms. Accordingly, method to stop proposed. Some computational experiments are carried out test criterion, modified version past. Empirical evidence shown support suitability criterion.