Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for It works by turning attention away from basis of relevant belief, namely, toward what belief in turn provides for, other attitudes. short, argue an acquired testimony cannot provide rational further attitudes, such as admiration, best explanation not itself rational. If rational, knowledge. So, optimism false. After addressing number...

Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective one’s perspective on reasons, not objective determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, suggest, makes one has reason do, and hence turn matters outside or independent perspective. After explaining establishing point, offer novel avoids problem.

What is a normative reason for acting? In this paper, I introduce and defend novel answer to question. The starting-point the view that reasons are right-makers. By exploring difficulties facing it, arrive at an alternative, according which evidence of respects in it right perform act, example, keeps promise. This similar proposal person act she ought do so; however, as explain, differs from two significant ways. As result, argue, evidence-based account advance shares advantages its...

Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude believing. In recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist Anandi Hattiangadi raise number serious objections to this view. paper, I concede Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against formulation they consider, but suggest an alternative is available. After outlining alternative, argue it not vulnerable parallel those advance, although initially appear be. closing, consider what bearing preceding...

Abstract It is common to hear talk of the aim belief and find philosophers appealing that for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief's explains depends, course, on what is. Many hold it somehow related truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify using notion truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account standard correctness epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications given terms advance a neglected alternative.

A familiar and intuitive thought is that normative reasons must be able to guide us. That what seem for. Considerations cannot do are supposed do. To put the same point differently, it job of a reason recommend person perform certain act or hold some attitude. If job, relevant heed respond its recommendation. Thoughts like this lie behind following response constraint on reasons: RC distinct from principle implies can, according which: While entails RIC, converse does not hold. It consistent...

Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that and show it fails. More specifically, faces problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, is delivers wrong verdict in fake barn cases.

Abstract What does the aesthetic ask of us? claims do features objects and events in our environment make on My answer this paper is: that depends. Aesthetic reasons can only justify feelings – they cannot demand them. A corollary is there are no obligations to feel, permissions. However, I argue, actions not merely act, So, conclude, asks little us as patients much agents.

Abstract According to Normativism, what an expression means has immediate implications for how a subject should or may (not) employ that expression. Many view this thesis as imposing substantive constraints upon theories of linguistic meaning. In paper, I shall not consider view; instead, address the prior issue whether one accept Normativism. Against certain recent prominent lines attack common number different anti‐Normativist discussions, defend both Normativist and attempt appeal...

Abstract A normative reason for a person to φ is consideration which favours φing. motivating or on the basis of φs. This paper explores connection between and reasons. More specifically, it idea that there are second‐order reasons (not) certain first‐order In this paper, I challenge view so understood. then show prominent views in contemporary epistemology committed existence reasons, about epistemic norms governing practical reasoning role higher‐order evidence. If no those mistaken.

Journal Article The Normativity of Belief Get access Conor McHugh, McHugh 1University Southampton SO171BJ, UK Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Daniel Whiting Analysis, Volume 74, Issue 4, October 2014, Pages 698–713, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu079 Published: 27 August 2014

Meaning, according to a significant number of philosophers, is an intrinsically normative notion.1 For this reason, it suggested, meaning not conducive naturalistic explanation. In paper, I shall address whether indeed so. Nor present arguments in support the normativity thesis (see Glock 2005; Kripke 1982). Instead, examine and respond two forceful objections recently (and independently) raised against by Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006) Miller (2006). Although argue that are...

Abstract It is commonplace to claim that it good believe the truth . In this paper, I reject and argue considerations which might seem support in fact a quite distinct though superficially similar claim, namely, bad false This typically either ignored completely or lumped together with previous perhaps on assumption two are equivalent, at least they stand fall together. Such assumptions, argue, mistaken. While not always be right, wrong. an interesting overlooked asymmetry, calls for further...

An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief safe, in the relevant sense, just case it true nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood terms epistemically The main aim, doing so, to add epistemologist's tool-kit. To demonstrate usefulness tool, use advance and assess substantive proposals concerning justification.