This paper provides a general study of contest modeled as multiplayer incomplete‐information, all‐pay auction with sequential entry. The consists multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for prize. They observe the made by their earlier opponents, but not those contemporaneous or future rivals. We establish existence uniqueness symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) fully characterize equilibrium. Based on result, we show that later mover always...

Industries with significant scale economies or learning-by-doing may come to be dominated by a single firm. Economists have studied how likely this is happen, and whether it efficient, using models where buyers are price quantity takers, even though these industries often also characterized buyer-seller negotiations. We extend the dynamic "learning-by-doing forgetting" model of Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, Satterthwaite (2010) allow for Nash-in-Nash bargaining over prices. Price-taking...

Abstract An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonuses or promotions. The incumbent's perception of the hire's ability distribution is biased. This bias can result in overconfidence underconfidence. We show that debiasing may be counterproductive incentivizing efforts. then explore whether firm values employees’ efforts should disclose an informative signal about type and we characterize conditions under which transparency opacity optimal firm. further consider four...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the private information. subject to perceptional bias: His prior about hire’s type differs from true underlying distribution. He can be either ex ante overconfident underconfident. We first explore whether firm aims maximize aggregate effort would benefit suffer bias. It shown debiasing may not productive in incentivizing efforts. then study optimal information...

Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal the value players. Second, sets scoring rule contest, varies relative competitiveness We show that optimum depends on designer’s objective. bilateral symmetric contest—in information symmetrically distributed bias set offset initial asymmetry between...

Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets like artworks and homes, with follow-up held unsold items. We investigate such theoretically empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that recurring outperform single-round when buyers face entry costs, enhancing efficiency revenue due to sorted of potential buyers. Optimal reserve price sequences characterized. Empirical findings from home foreclosure in China reveal significant annual gains (3.40 billion USD, 16.60%) (2.97...

Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets, such as land, home, or artwork: When the seller cannot sell item in initial auction, she often holds a subsequent auction near future. This paper characterizes design of recurring auctions, both theoretically and empirically. On theoretical side, we show that outperform single-round efficiency revenue when potential buyers face costly entry. occurs because allow with different values to enter at times, which generates savings...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the private information. subject to perceptional bias: His prior about hire’s type differs from true underlying distribution. He can be either ex ante overconfident underconfident. We first explore whether firm aims maximize aggregate effort would benefit suffer bias. It shown debiasing may not productive in incentivizing efforts. then study optimal information disclosure...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent's ability is commonly known, while that of the private information.The subject to perceptional bias: His prior about hire's type differs from true underlying distribution. He can be either ex ante overconfident underconfident. We first explore whether firm aims maximize aggregate effort would benefit suffer bias. It shown debiasing may not productive in incentivizing efforts. then study optimal...

In anticipation of a procurement auction, speculators have the incentive to consolidate market by acquiring items from different sellers. By doing so, gain power and can reduce competition in auction. Consequently, speculator's expected auction may be high more than enough cover acquisition costs. To study profitability welfare implications such speculation scheme, I incorporate speculator pre-auction stage an independent private value model.

A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power then be exercised in and may lead to large enough gain cover acquisition costs. I show that speculation always generates positive expected profit second-price auctions but could unprofitable first-price auctions. In case where is profitable auctions, it more This comparison profitability driven different competition patterns two mechanisms. terms welfare,...