We investigate a mixed duopoly, where state‐owned welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firm. use Hotelling‐type spatial model which represents product differentiation. endogenize production costs by introducing cost‐reducing activities. show that the firm's cost becomes lower than because engages in excessive strategic Even though each is heterogeneous, locations of firms are socially efficient, given differentials. Privatization would improve welfare it...

We investigate how common ownership affects welfare in a vertically related market. Although mitigates the double marginalization problem and improves welfare, it restricts competition among downstream firms harms welfare. find that whether is welfare‐improving depends on degree of competitiveness Common more likely to improve when there are fewer greater product differentiation. In other words, may market weak.

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state‐owned public firm and foreign private compete. examine desirable role (either leader or follower) of the firm. also consider endogenous roles by adopting observable delay game Hamilton Slutsky (1990). find that, in contrast to Pal (1998) discussing case domestic competitors, should be that it becomes game. Ono (1990) eliminating does not improve welfare oligopolies.

Abstract We investigate a mixed market where state‐owned welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. use circular city model with quantity‐setting competition. In contrast to pure case discussed by Pal (1998a) , spatial agglomeration of firms always appears in equilibrium. All locate at the same point, and locates opposite side. also find that this equilibrium pattern location is second best provided output each cannot be controlled social planner. JEL...

Abstract We investigate optimal tax‐subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. compare the subsidies resulting welfare levels among four regimes: Cournot duopolies Stackelberg competition public leaderships. show that, contrast to existing works on privatization neutrality theorem, affects welfare.

We revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms' payoffs. Previous research investigates in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. It shows that the outcome is completely different from of oligopoly. In contrast to its result, we find this change payoff does not matter as long payoffs are symmetric. Our result indicates asymmetry, and welfare‐concerning objectives, yields...

We formulate several quantity and price competition models that investigate the adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) by firms competing in market. First, we consider emission cap commitments. Under competition, ECSR is adopted joint-profit-maximizing industry associations because its effect weakening competition. However, it not without associations. By contrast, under individual voluntarily adopt they choose a higher level with Second, intensity commitments...

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low-cost firms compete against less high-cost firms. find that an increase in the number of can stimulate by firms, while it always reduces More importantly, this force be strong enough to compensate for loss arises from more intense market competition: firms' profits may indeed An implication result is far-reaching, as gives incentive help, rather than harm, competitors. relate practice known open knowledge...

We investigate a mixed economy where state-owned public enterprises compete against private firms. examine sequential privatization of enterprises, and find that under plausible assumptions one increases the welfare gains subsequent privatizations. Thus, even if does not improve at early stages, it can eventually lead to point such privatizations after are beneficial society program ends up with success.

This paper investigates the long-run effect of foreign penetration in product markets on privatization policies. We find that optimal degree is increasing penetration. result sharp contrast to existing short-run it decreasing. Our suggests from a viewpoint, country with more open market should promote public enterprises, even though this reduces welfare short run.