Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for study; Details situation used; Discussion equilibrium. (From Ebsco)

This article establishes the relationship between static axiomatic theory of bargaining and sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two models alternating offers. The differ in source incentive parties reach agreement: bargainers' time preference risk breakdown negotiations. Each has a unique perfect equilibrium. When motivation agreement is made negligible, each model equilibrium outcome approaches Nash solution with utilities that reflect settle proper disagreement point...

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models as those which elements process choice are explicitly embedded. book focuses on challenges modeling rationality, rather than substantial economic implications. first part author considers choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to procedural knowledge, memory, what know, and group...

This paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out transaction brought together by stochastic process and, upon meeting, initiate bargaining over the terms transaction.The basic problem is treated with strategic approach.The derives steady state equilibrium agreements; analyzes their dependence on conditions such as relative numbers different types; and discusses relations competitive outcome other results search literature.1133

The paper is a discussion of the interpretation game theory. Game theory viewed as an abstract inquiry into concepts used in social reasoning when dealing with situations conflict and not attempt to predict behavior. first half deals notion strategy. Its principal claim that conventional strategy consistent manner which it applied, this inconsistency frequently results confusion misunderstanding. In order prove point, term discussed three contexts: extensive games players have act more than...

The article questions the methodology of “economics and psychology” in its focus on case hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that same type evidence, which rejects standard constant discount utility functions, can just as easily reject discounting well. Furthermore, a decision‐making procedure based similarity relations better explains observations is more intuitive. concludes combining requires opening black box decision makers instead modifying functional forms.

Etude d'un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete. Caracterisation d'une classe d'equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres et demonstration l'unicite cet equilibre

Journal Article Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times Get access Ariel Rubinstein Tel Aviv University New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 117, Issue 523, October 2007, Pages 1243–1259, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02081.x Published: 21 September 2007 history Received: 16 January 2006 Accepted: 14 August

The authors study the Nash equilibria of a two-person, infinitely-repeated game in which players' preferences depend on repeated payoffs and complexity strategies they use. model considered is that A. Rubinstein (1986). Necessary conditions structure are derived. These results place significant restrictions equilibrium payoffs. suggest introduction implementation costs striking discontinuity sets terms Copyright 1988 by Econometric Society.

Journal Article Middlemen Get access Ariel Rubinstein, Rubinstein The Hebrew University, Jerusalem Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Asher Wolinsky Quarterly of Economics, Volume 102, Issue 3, August 1987, Pages 581–593, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884218 Published: 01 1987

We develop a framework for modelling choice in the presence of framing effects. An extended function assigns chosen element to every pair (A, f) where A is set alternatives, and f frame. frame includes observable information that irrelevant rational assessment but nonetheless affects choice. relate new classical model correspondence. Conditions are identified under which there exists either transitive or complete binary relation R such an alternative x some iff R-maximal A. then demonstrate...

We study experimentally a new two-player game: each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the requested if he exactly one shekel less than other player, additional Level-k reasoning is appealing due to natural starting point (requesting 20) straightforward best-response operation. Nevertheless, almost all subjects exhibit at most three levels of reasoning. Two variants game demonstrate that depth not increased by enhancing attractiveness level-0 strategy or...

Journal Article A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics Get access Ariel Rubinstein Tel Aviv UniversityNew York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 116, Issue 510, March 2006, Pages C1–C9, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01071.x Published: 28 February 2006

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing theory's foundations interpretations its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions full proofs results, sacrificing generalities limiting scope material order to do so. text is organized four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, imperfect coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.(This abstract was...