A contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win prize. Examples abound. Firms spending RD 26], Krueger [14], Posner [20], Rogerson [23], Appelbaum and Katz [1], Hillman Riley [12], Hirshleifer [13], Ellingsen [8], Nitzan [18], Baik [2; 3] have studied rent-seeking contests. Lazear Rosen [15], O'Keeffe, Viscusi, Zeckhauser [19], [24] examined performance incentives associated reward schemes. [22] has analyzed the war of attrition auctions. Dixit...

We consider a rent‐seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays. examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and effect such on rent dissipation. show following: When just one is formed equilibrium, beneficial both to members nonmembers, dissipation smaller than with usual individual seeking. However, when more two are never profitable any players, greater

We study contests in which two groups compete to win (or not win) a group-specific public-good/bad prize. Each player the can exert types of effort: one help her own group prize, and sabotage group's chances winning it. The players choose their effort levels simultaneously independently. introduce specific form contest success function that determines each probability taking into account players' activities. show purestrategy Nash equilibrium occur, depending on parameter values: without...

I examine players' equilibrium effort levels in two‐player asymmetric contests with ratio‐form contest success functions. first characterize the Nash of simultaneous‐move game. show that ratio is equal to valuation ratio, and prize dissipation ratios for players are same. also each player less than or minimum probabilities winning at thus never exceeds a half. Then how ratios, respond when valuations their abilities change.

Conflicts between a firm and citizens′ group can arise over environmental regulation or enforcement. The the compete, often in courts, rewards of varying levels This paper explores efficiency consequences contest where group′s legal expenditures are reimbursed if victorious. Relative to symmetric reimbursement, we demonstrate that asymmetric reimbursement reduces total amount effort expended. In addition, reparations exceed 50% expenses, will move first invest zero effort. We also consider...

We study collective rent seeking between two groups in which each group has the option of releasing or not its sharing‐rule information. First, we show that case where both release their information never occurs equilibrium; when players are unevenly matched, one releases and other does not. Then, select Pareto‐superior equilibrium matched. that, this selected equilibrium, underdog information, favorite not; thus, becomes leader, follower ( JEL D72).

We experimentally investigate the effects of conflict budget on intensity. run a between-subjects Tullock contest in which we vary from Low to Medium High, while keeping risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bid same. find non-monotonic relationship: bids increase when increases Medium, but decrease further High. This can happen for players with concave utility, if high has wealth effect that reduces marginal utility winning resulting lower bids. To test this, Wealth treatment remains contestants...

Contests between players with unknown relative ability are common. Under the plausible condition of decreasing aversion to uncertain ability, a player in contest expends more resources than known ability. If spying is allowed reduce uncertainty about then case unobservable spying, level high, effort low, and total expected payoffs high observable spying. Consequently, social cost low as compared

Do consumers' consumer‐surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent‐seeking firm, ' CS‐defending generally monopoly, but given two or more firms, such reduce costs. ( JEL D72, L12)

We define a winner‐help‐loser group in rent‐seeking contest as follows: (a) the member players compete noncooperatively to win rent, and (b) if player wins he helps losing according previously written agreement. demonstrate that one only is formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such formation rent dissipation small relative individual seeking. Therefore, decreases social cost associated with seeking thus economic inefficiency

We study a model of civil dispute with delegation in which plaintiff’s lawyer works on contingent‐fee basis but defendant’s an hourly fee basis. first derive the condition under to lawyers brings both litigants more payoffs compared case no delegation. then show that this profitable condition, fraction for is about one‐third. Next, allowing plaintiff choose between two fees, we chooses contingent fee, given defendant adopts fee. ( JEL K41, K13, D74, D72)