A5021196550- Security and Verification in Computing
- Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Radiation Effects in Electronics
- Cloud Data Security Solutions
- Machine Learning and Data Classification
- Ecology and Vegetation Dynamics Studies
- Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Plant Diversity and Evolution
- Smart Grid Energy Management
- Advanced Battery Technologies Research
- Evolutionary Algorithms and Applications
- Green IT and Sustainability
- Leaf Properties and Growth Measurement
Stanford University
2022-2024
Tucson Unified School District
2012
• Premise of the Study: Leaf area is a key trait that links plant form, function, and environment. Measures leaf can be biased because often estimated from dried or fossilized specimens have shrunk by an unknown amount. We tested common assumption this shrinkage negligible. Methods: measured comparing dry fresh in 3401 leaves 380 temperate tropical species used phylogenetic trait‐based approaches to determine predictors shrinkage. also effects rehydration simulated fossilization on four...
We propose leakage containment models (LCMs)---novel axiomatic security contracts which support formally reasoning about the guarantees of programs when they run on particular microarchitectures. Our core contribution is an vocabulary for formalizing LCMs, derived from established processor memory consistency models. Using this vocabulary, we formalize microarchitectural leakage---focusing through hardware systems---so that it can be automatically detected in and provide a taxonomy...
We present uSpectre, a new class of transient execution attacks that exploit microcode branch mispredictions to transiently leak sensitive data. find many long-known and recently-discovered attacks, which were previously categorized as Spectre or Meltdown variants, are actually instances uSpectre on some Intel microarchitectures. Based our observations, we discover multiple defense against vulnerabilities, called uSLH.
Today, consumer battery installations are isolated, physical devices. Virtual power plants (VPPs) allow devices to aggregate for grid services, but they vertically integrated, vendor controlled systems (e.g., Tesla's VPP). Consumer batteries therefore unable participate in energy markets or other services outside what their provides.
We present Serberus, the first comprehensive mitigation for hardening constant-time (CT) code against Spectre attacks (involving PHT, BTB, RSB, STL and/or PSF speculation primitives) on existing hardware. Serberus is based three insights. First, some hardware control-flow integrity (CFI) protections restrict transient to extent that it may be comprehensively considered by software analyses. Second, conformance accepted CT discipline permits two patterns are unsafe in post-Spectre era. Third,...
There is a growing need for hardware-software contracts which precisely define the implications of microarchitecture on software security-i.e., security contracts. It our view that such should explicitly account microarchitecture-level implementation details underpin hardware leakage, thereby establishing direct correspondence between contract and it represents. At same time, these remain as abstract possible so to support efficient formal analyses. With goals in mind, we propose leakage...