Revisiting physicians' financial incentives in Quebec: a panel system approach

• DOI: 10.1002/hec.1012
• Publication Date: 2005-09-15T18:17:12Z
• Authors: Abdelhak Nassiri; Lise Rochaix
• Keywords: Complementarity (molecular biology)

Abstract Do Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) react strategically to financial incentives and if so how? To address this question, we follow a quasi‐natural experiment in Quebec, using panel system technique. In doing, both correct for underestimation biases earlier time series findings generate new results on the issue of complementarity/substitution between consultations with varying levels technicality. Under techniques, show that PCPs are sensitive enforcement subsequent temporary removals expenditure caps more generally, changes consultations' relative prices over time. These support existence discretionary power choice consultation, increasing number technical (and therefore lucrative) when pressed defend their income. This finding primary care parallels now well‐established DRG creep hospitals. The approach offers better account complexity surrounding PCPs' decision‐making process. particular, it successfully addresses issues physician heterogeneity, jointness temporal breaks generates robust estimates volume quality reactions regulatory changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.