Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
Internalism and externalism
Externalism
Enactivism
Mind–body problem
DOI:
10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2
Publication Date:
2008-12-19T10:37:59Z
AUTHORS (2)
ABSTRACT
This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
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