How Lasers Exploit Photoacoustic and Photoelectric Phenomena to Inject Signals into MEMS Microphones

• DOI: 10.1007/s41635-025-00159-9
• Publication Date: 2025-05-01T07:21:02Z
• Authors: Benjamin Cyr; Vedant Sumaria; Yan Long; Srinivas Tadigadapa; Takeshi Sugawara; Kevin Fu

Abstract An amplitude-modulated laser can be used to generate false, yet coherent acoustic signals on the outputs of MEMS microphones. While this vulnerability has ramifications on the security of cyber-physical systems that trust these microphones, the physical explanation of this effect remained a mystery. Without an understanding of the physical phenomena contributing to this signal injection, it is difficult to design effective and reliable defenses. In this work, we show the degree to which the mechanisms of thermoelastic bending, thermal diffusion, and photocurrent generation are used to inject signals into MEMS microphones. We provide models for each of these mechanisms, develop a procedure to empirically determine their relative contributions, and highlight the effects on eight commercial MEMS microphones. We accomplish this with a precise setup to isolate each mechanism using several laser wavelengths and a vacuum chamber. The results indicate that the injected signal on the microphone is dependent on the wavelength of the incoming light. Shorter wavelengths (such as a 450 nm blue laser) exploit photoacoustic effects, and the periodic heating and expansion of air is the dominant factor in seven of eight sample microphones. Longer wavelengths (such as a 904 nm infrared laser) exploit photoelectric effects on the sensitive ASIC, generating signals that are between 2x and 100x stronger than photoacoustic signals in six of eight sample microphones. This understanding of the physical causality of laser signal injection leads to recommendations for future laser-resistant microphone designs. These include adding light-blocking structures at the system or device level, improving to glob top application, and adding simple light or temperature sensors for injection detection. Based on the fundamental causality, we also suggest potential vulnerabilities within other sensors with similar characteristics to MEMS microphones, such as conventional microphones, ultrasonic sensors, and inertial sensors.