Single-party regime, cooptation, and strategic social spending in developing countries

• DOI: 10.1007/s44216-024-00041-5
• Publication Date: 2024-11-02T01:01:58Z
• Authors: Li Zheng
• Keywords: Social welfare; Political institutions and public administration - Asia (Asian studies only); 05 social sciences; Pension; HD72-88; JQ1-6651; Economic growth, development, planning; Cooptation; Single-party regime; Developing countries; 0506 political science

Abstract How regime types affect the provision of social spending in context developing countries? This article provides a novel political-economic approach, arguing that single-party regimes are more likely to spend on pensions than other autocratic states co-opt large number critical members although type does not general welfare across states. The theory emphasizes effect institutional and power structure heterogeneity autocracies shaping incentives strategies ruling elites respond demands coalition different regimes. Using panel, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with lagged dependent variable along several empirical strategies, it finds evidence supporting this argument new dataset from 1990 2012. study insights how institutions especially party utilize strategic policies resolve elite-level dictator dilemma for survival absent types.