Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
0301 basic medicine
03 medical and health sciences
DOI:
10.1016/j.amc.2019.06.007
Publication Date:
2019-07-06T11:01:45Z
AUTHORS (6)
ABSTRACT
Abstract The popularity of each individual in a realistic social system adaptively changes within a population. In this paper, we propose the coevolution of popularity and strategy and explore potential reasons that how this setup affects the evolution of cooperation in structured population. The popularity of each individual is defined as a function of parameter α and vertex weight that evolves by δ overtime. Through simulation, we find that our mechanism enables the survival of cooperation when b is relatively large. For the above results, we provide a detailed explanation through systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. Our conclusion provides an insight for understanding cooperation in social systems.
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