Legislature size and welfare: Evidence from Brazil

• DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12843
• Publication Date: 2024-04-30T08:24:10Z
• Authors: Umberto Mignozzetti; Gabriel Cepaluni; Danilo Freire
• Keywords: Human Society; Economics; Clinical Research; Applied Economics; Political Science; Policy and Administration; Applied economics; 1. No poverty; Political Science & Public Administration; 16. Peace & justice; Political science; Policy and administration

Abstract How does legislature size impact public service provision? Despite the importance of institutional design for democratic governance, effect legislative features on citizen welfare remains little understood. In this article, we use a formal model to show that increasing improves goods delivery. We argue changes in bargaining costs depend whether additional legislators share executive's party affiliation: More opposition members reduce equilibrium provision, while more government‐aligned increase it. test theory by exploiting sharp discontinuities city‐council Brazil. an city councilor has 91% chance belonging mayoral coalition, and significantly primary school enrollment infant mortality rates. To explore possible mechanisms, surveyed 174 former councilors analyzed 346,553 bills proposed between 2005 2008. This article implications representative institutions.