(Mis)aligning politicians and admirals: The problems of long‐term procurement in the Canadian Surface Combatant project 1994‐2021

• DOI: 10.1111/capa.12449
• Publication Date: 2022-02-12T13:14:30Z
• Authors: Andrea Migone; Alexander Howlett; Michael Howlett
• Keywords: Combatant; Disarmament; Government procurement

Abstract Popular depictions of the largest single procurement project in Canadian history—the Surface Combatant (CSC) project—characterize it as a bureaucratic failure. What began 2008 $26.2B has expanded to at least $77.3B, and $2B already been spent without having produced vessel. Unlike other major aircraft, helicopter, submarine contracts over past four decades, however, participants CSC have lauded technical merits process. This article argues that successful this area requires: (a) clear (naval) doctrine supporting why specific (weapons) platform or system is needed; (b) government acceptance doctrine. When these two imperatives are aligned, should proceed relatively smoothly. However, such smooth highly unlikely when systems purchases involve long time periods shifts elected governments, policy goals, undermine previous understandings agreements.