Prestige Seeking in College Application and Major Choice
Prestige
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.4309000
Publication Date:
2022-12-28T11:31:55Z
AUTHORS (5)
ABSTRACT
We develop a signaling model of prestige seeking in competitive college applications. A prestigious program attracts high-ability applicants, making its admissions more selective, which turn further increases prestige, and so on. This amplifying effect results with negligible quality advantage enjoying significant equilibrium. Furthermore, applicants "sacrifice" their fits for programs pursuit the misallocation fits. Major choice data from Seoul National University provides evidence our theoretical predictions when majors are assigned through screening—a common feature worldwide.
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