Beyond Second Chambers: Alternative Representation of Territorial Interests and Their Reasons

Federalism representation bilateralism 05 social sciences Second Chambers Comparative Constitutional Law 16. Peace & justice Representation 0506 political science federalism JF20-2112 participation Political institutions and public administration (General) inter-governmental relations second chambers
DOI: 10.2478/pof-2018-0016 Publication Date: 2018-08-15T00:30:57Z
ABSTRACT
Abstract The paper contends that bicameral systems, irrespective of their differences in composition and powers, are unfit to represent territorial interests in the national decisionmaking process, except in some residual cases. What subnational entities seek is participation rather than representation. This is why alternative, executive-based institutions in which also the national government is present are mushrooming and second chambers are ineffective as territorial bodies. Furthermore, there is a clear trend to move from bicameralism to bilateralism, meaning that instead of taking advantage of ineffective multilateral institutions, strong subnational units try to channel their claims through bilateral instruments. Overall, the unresolved dilemma of subnational representation has little to do with the architecture of second chambers and rather lays in the tension between individual and collective representation.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Coming soon ....
REFERENCES (0)
CITATIONS (9)
EXTERNAL LINKS
PlumX Metrics
RECOMMENDATIONS
FAIR ASSESSMENT
Coming soon ....
JUPYTER LAB
Coming soon ....