Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

• DOI: 10.7554/elife.82954
• Publication Date: 2023-05-19T00:00:20Z
• Authors: Linjie Liu; Xiaojie Chen; Attila Szolnoki
• Keywords: Social dilemma; Dynamics; Social Dynamics

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption is constant affected by behaviors. Here, we develop coevolutionary game approach captures coupled dynamics cooperation risk. In particular, level population affects state risk, while turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, explore two representative feedback forms describing possible effect strategy on namely, linear exponential feedbacks. We find can be maintained keeping at certain fraction or forming evolutionary oscillation with independently type. However, such outcome depends initial state. Taken together, two-way coupling between collective actions essential avoid tragedy commons. More importantly, critical starting portion cooperators what really need for guiding evolution toward desired direction.