Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates number of predictions for delegate behavior within parliament, the opacity such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem exploiting transcripts query sessions Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question...

The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using in this way, however, authoritarians face trade‐off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. article, we explore how single‐party regimes manage particular types available them. Using candidate‐level data from Vietnam, demonstrate that regimes, particular, forsake overall regime support strength opposition favor...

An influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, incentive for improved is created by voters’ responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun export interventions authoritarian regimes under assumption nongovernmental organizations and media substitute incentives voters. Such interventions, however, are at odds with an emerging argues parliaments...

Are representatives in authoritarian legislatures encouraged to take positions on salient issues? More generally, why do some autocracies allow public debate hot topics at all? Understanding the dynamics of legislative is important for roles are theorized play regime legitimation and information provision. I argue that decision depends autocratic incentives mobilize sentiment against bureaucracy. While allowing issues risks galvanizing antiregime sentiment, doing so may also opinion wayward...

Proponents of the “China Model” suggest that autocracies, particularly in East Asia, reward competence more than democracies. However, a competing literature argues autocracies are less likely to because autocrats fear competent officials could challenge for power. We argue do not technical competence; they political competence. As such, may promote ministers with but punish politically competent. Democracies, by contrast, place premium on when deciding whom promote. provide first test this...

Abstract During recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested corruption stripped of his membership. Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable explain these outcomes. particular, both competent well connected. This cuts contrary expectations performance-based factional theories. We...

Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election brings a rematch between incumbent Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, though against backdrop of increasingly active conservative Islamic movements. Analyses this contest – as well contemporary Indonesian politics more generally are often based on assumptions around which constituencies matter political factions they support. This paper examines those using an original dataset fine-grained returns census data, including latent variable to capture the...

The 2007 National Assembly (NA) election in Vietnam inspired the imagination of observers. New electoral procedures boded well for increased competition and representation. This article probes this outcome, providing a detailed account how Vietnamese process works practice. It concludes that despite well-publicized institutional changes, composition post-election NA still reflects preplanned script even possesses slightly smaller shares non-party members self-nominated candidates than...

A commonly proffered theory to explain the use of elections in authoritarian regimes is that they help identify talented young leaders who can be groomed for leadership positions. Unfortunately, due difficulties obtaining data settings, this hypothesis has not been tested satisfactorily. We examine candidate-level from 2007 Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA) election and subsequent selection candidates top positions within VNA ministry find no evidence vote share associated with promotion...

Abstract This paper explores the salience of north‐south identity in Vietnam. Using focus groups and survey data, we argue that Vietnam is characterized by asymmetric ingroup bias , where southerners hold higher levels favoritism outgroup discrimination than north. However, while exists, its limited because it crosscuts with other social identities. Survey data show little difference between north south regarding nationalism, support for redistribution, trade, authoritarian values...

Malaysia's previously hegemonic Barisan Nasional (BN) government was unexpectedly defeated in the 2018 general election despite a fragmented opposition and widespread three-corner fights that theory states should inhibit turnover. Why? We argue opposition-split hypothesis rests on three core assumptions: third parties split only anti-incumbent vote; coalition/party support is relatively uniform across country; are not “elite splits” disguise. The Malaysian context challenges all of these...

Abstract Why do voters in single-party regimes express support for the ruling party such large numbers? Scholars offer three sets of explanations: 1) Support is manipulated by regime leaders or falsified frightened voters; 2) due to genuine popularity “performance legitimacy”; 3) The incumbent holds an extreme incumbency advantage voters’ certainty about their candidates’ policy positions access state resources. Despite impressive theoretical development this literature, these arguments have...

How does the salience of clientelism in politics impact voter support for women legislative candidates? Existing research finds little bias against candidates survey experiments. Where exists, it is due to “role congruity,” where voters penalize because a perceived lack specific traits or issue preferences suitable position. Building on existing work, I theorize that ability deliver patronage “role” might find stereotypically incongruous with women. Using two waves nationally representative...

The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using in this way, however, authoritarians face tradeoff between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. paper, we explore how single-party regimes manage particular types available them. Using candidate-level data from Vietnam, demonstrate that regimes, particular, forsake overall regime support strength opposition favor...

Research shows that the presence of more female politicians can reduce gender gaps in political knowledge. Despite these findings, no study examines whether role model effect applies to autocracies. This is an important oversight given knowledge plays increasing use nonelectoral forms accountability. To test models increase autocracies, this uses unique survey data from Vietnam occurring before and after a leadership change. In transition, all top leaders changed male different except for...

All regimes, even authoritarian ones, rely on charismatic politicians for legitimacy and mobilization, but popular leaders can also leverage mass followings to advance personal interests. We argue that party-building norms institutions help ameliorate this dilemma by fostering cultures of collective charisma among prospective leaders. Comparing across single-party regimes in China Vietnam, we show how recruitment vetting foster collectivist rising politicians. Counterintuitively, our...