Albert Newen

ORCID: 0000-0001-5906-6061
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Face Recognition and Perception
  • Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
  • Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Emotions and Moral Behavior
  • Free Will and Agency
  • Classical Philosophy and Thought
  • Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Linguistic research and analysis
  • Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Memory and Neural Mechanisms
  • Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
  • Cultural Differences and Values
  • Identity, Memory, and Therapy
  • German Literature and Culture Studies
  • Neural dynamics and brain function
  • Multisensory perception and integration
  • Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
  • Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Ruhr University Bochum
2015-2024

Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy
2021-2024

Brain (Germany)
2012-2016

LWL-Universitätsklinikum Bochum
2015

University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf
2008

University Hospital Bonn
2008

University of Cologne
2008

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
2008

Düsseldorf University Hospital
2008

Universität Hamburg
2008

Abstract Human self-consciousness relies on the ability to distinguish between oneself and others. We sought explore neural correlates involved in self-other representations by investigating two critical processes: perspective taking agency. Although recent research has shed light processes underlying these phenomena, little is known about how they overlap or interact at level. In a two-factorial functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, participants played ball-tossing game...

10.1162/jocn.2006.18.6.898 article EN Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 2006-06-01

Abstract We develop a version of direct perception account emotion recognition on the basis metaphysical claim that emotions are individuated as patterns characteristic features. On our account, relies same type pattern is described for object recognition. The analogy allows us to distinguish two forms directly perceiving emotions, namely an in (near) absence any top‐down processes, and way significantly involves some processes (including expectations background knowledge); and, addition,...

10.1111/mila.12077 article EN Mind & Language 2015-04-01

Writing over a century ago, Darwin hypothesized that vocal expression of emotion dates back to our earliest terrestrial ancestors. If this hypothesis is true, we should expect find cross-species acoustic universals in emotional vocalizations. Studies suggest attributes aroused vocalizations are shared across many mammalian species, and humans can use these infer content. But do extend non-mammalian vertebrates? In study, asked human participants judge the content nine vertebrate species...

10.1098/rspb.2017.0990 article EN Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences 2017-07-26

Abstract In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration bodily perceptions with representations external objects, events, or states affairs. We put forward our contrasting it Prinz's (2004) pure theory, entirely perceptions. After illustrating and discussing evidence in its favor, show that is beset serious problems—i.e., gets neural correlates emotion wrong, isn't able distinguish from aren't emotions, cannot...

10.1111/phpr.12041 article EN Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2013-06-18

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how experience differs in detail between quality question). We propose a framework clearly distinguishes both questions tackles them. This two-tier account along ten dimensions suggests cognitive capacities serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong weak indicators the presence consciousness. Second,...

10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105409 article EN cc-by-nc-nd Cognition 2023-02-22

Preface Part I. Indexicals and Names: Reflexivity, indexicality names John Perry Tensed thoughts James Higginbotham First person propositions: a Fregean account Wolfgang Kunne First-Person Reference, Representational independence self-knowledge Christopher Peacocke The logic of indexical attitudes the metaphysics self Albert Newen address puzzle Thomas Zimmerman mechanics counterpart relation Henk Zeevat Names, indexicals, identity statements Ernesto Napoli II. Attitude Reports: Frege's...

10.2307/417699 article EN Language 2000-06-01

Abstract In the recent literature on concepts, two extreme positions concerning animal minds are predominant: one that animals possess neither concepts nor beliefs, and some as well beliefs. A characteristic feature of this controversy is lack consensus criteria for possessing a concept or having belief. Addressing deficit, we propose new theory which takes case studies complex behavior into account. The main aim paper to present an epistemic defend detailed concepts. distinction between...

10.1080/09515080701358096 article EN Philosophical Psychology 2007-05-24

Do our background beliefs, desires, and mental images influence perceptual experience of the emotions others? In this paper, we will address possibility cognitive penetration (CP) in domain social cognition. particular, focus on emotion recognition based visual facial expressions. After introducing current debate CP, review examples adaptation for expressions emotion. This evidence supports idea that are perceptually processed as wholes. That is, system integrates lower-level features, such...

10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00828 article EN cc-by Frontiers in Psychology 2015-06-19

Do we have to presuppose a self account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should characterize the self? These questions are discussed in context of two alternatives, i.e., no-self position held by Metzinger (2003, 2009) and claim that only is narrative (Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 2007; Hardcastle, 2008) which primarily an abstract entity. In contrast these theories, I argue embodied self, although this not metaphysical substance, nor entity stable necessary jointly sufficient...

10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02270 article EN cc-by Frontiers in Psychology 2018-11-23

Understanding and predicting other people's mental states behavior are important prerequisites for social interactions. The capacity to attribute such as desires, thoughts or intentions oneself others is referred mentalizing. right posterior temporal cortex at the temporal–parietal junction has been associated with mentalizing but also taking someone else's spatial perspective onto world—possibly an prerequisite Here, we directly compared neural correlates of using same stimulus material. We...

10.1093/scan/nsn023 article EN cc-by-nc Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 2008-08-07

Abstract Episodic memories can no longer be seen as the re-activation of stored experiences but are product an intense construction process based on a memory trace. recall is result scenario construction. If one accepts this generative framework episodic memory, there still big gap in understanding role narrative self shaping Some philosophers principle sceptic by claiming that cannot more than causally inefficacious attributed entity anyway. Thus, we first characterize detail and second...

10.1007/s13164-021-00581-2 article EN cc-by Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2021-08-13
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