Do remittances increase corruption in recipient states? Previous research suggests that allow governments to maintain policies create corrupt state–society relations. In contrast, this paper argues mitigate by increasing government accountability and providing other incentives reform. Using data from Mexico 2001–2007, study shows trended downward states receiving larger remittance sums, after controlling for political competition, divided government, market openness. The results are robust...

This article examines the potential for remittances to aggravate or mitigate corruption in recipient states. Unlike previous research that posits unidirectional effects, I emphasize how governments' and migrants' incentives interact domestic political environment argue both outcomes are possible. Aggravating effects most likely closed regimes because governments require smaller winning coalitions may be more view as an opportunity increase patronage. Moreover, costs of activity higher...

A greater understanding of the molecular basis breast cancer metastasis will lead to identification novel therapeutic targets and better treatments. Rap1B is a small GTPase that suppresses cells by increasing cell-cell adhesion. In cancer, decrease in prenylation subsequent loss at plasma membrane decreases adhesion increases cell scattering, which promotes metastatic phenotype. Protein kinase (PKA) was recently found phosphorylate inhibit its prenylation. PKA activated G protein-coupled...

Drawing on comparative resource curse literature and American the determinants of corruption, we argue that impact natural extraction corruption outcomes is state-dependent. That is, in environments where already high, windfalls allow political actors economic elites to take advantage state brokerage, further increasing corruption. However, previously less-corrupt states, increased will not induce We rely hierarchical linear models interpret federal convictions data for fifty states between...

Several U.S. cities have turned control of their schools from elected boards to the mayor. Advocates mayoral argued that this structure allows voters hold mayor directly accountable for performance local schools. Now public report test scores each year, it is possible attribute responsibility scores. This article analyzes survey data 16 in United States been matched with on We find that, general, score changes are not associated support incumbent mayors, except districts control, where...

Following the collapse of old communist regimes, 28 post-communist countries chose from among three main foreign security arrangements: commonwealth independent states (CIS)/collective treaty organization (CSTO) membership, north atlantic (NATO) or neutrality. What explains these choices? We are most interested theoretically in role played by regime type. The alliances literature typically uses a narrow institutional theory effects type, which implies that more democratic regimes attractive...

Independent judicial systems exist to protect individual rights from state encroachment and majoritarian pressures. Citizens’ property depend particularly on judiciaries’ willingness ability restrain the political branches of power. In turn, upholding rule law perspective enforcing contracts securing is seen as crucial for promoting economic development because investment capital will flee without government commitments not seize or tax profits at confiscatory rates. This article brings...

Journal Article Much More than Money: Remittances and Human Development Get access Migrant in the Global Economy. By Manuel Orozco. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013. 249 pp., $59.95 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-1-588-26871-6). Michael D Tyburski Department of Political Science University Wisconsin-Milwaukee Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 3, September 2014, Pages 489–490, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12145...

Outsourcing Welfare: How the Money Immigrants Send Home Contributes to Stability in Developing Countries. By Roy Germano. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 240p. $29.95 cloth. - Volume 17 Issue 2