This paper is concerned with the question of how to define core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus on cooperative games which players face finite sequence exogenously specified TU-games. Three different concepts are presented: classical core, strong sequential and weak core. differences between arise from interpretations profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions given for nonemptiness general case two players. Simplifying characterizations provided....

In this paper, we give a historical overview of the transition from classical game theory to epistemic theory. To that purpose will discuss how important notions such as reasoning about opponents, belief hierarchies, common belief, and concept in rationality arose, gradually entered theoretic picture, thereby giving birth field We also address question why it took so long before finally incorporated natural aspect "reasoning" into its analysis. answer latter have close look at earliest...

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in opponents' rationality (BOR), stating that player believes every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), his opponents hold correct about own beliefs, (3) projective (PB), i j's k's choice is same as i's choice, and (4) conditionally independent (CIB), types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if satisfies BOR, SRB CIB, SRB, PB...

In this paper we want to shed some light on what mean by backward induction and forward reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, take the concepts of common belief future rationality (Perea [1]) extensive form rationalizability (Pearce [2], Battigalli [3], Siniscalchi [4]) as possible representatives for reasoning. We compare both a conceptual, epistemic an algorithm level, thereby highlighting crucial differences between

This paper investigates static games with unawareness, where players may be unaware of some the choices that can made. That is, different have views on game. We propose an epistemic model encodes players' belief hierarchies and views, use it to formulate basic reasoning concept common in rationality . do so for two scenarios: one which we only limit possible enter hierarchies, fix views. For both scenarios design a recursive elimination procedure yields every view rationally made under rationality.

In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss Nash where players averse and the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses—are endogenous equilibrium calculation. The first type is fixed point equilibrium, introduced Shalev (2000; Int. J. Game Theory 29(2):269) under name 'myopic equilibrium.' There, players' points depend on beliefs about their opponents' strategies. second type, maximin differs from that...

Abstract We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component has a value, which is total surplus can generate working together. present simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in at every stage two link, (i,j) bargain about their share from they part of. show that this procedure yields Myerson value (Myerson, 1997) if marginal any link increasing number links component.