We introduce an incentivized elicitation method for identifying social norms that uses simple coordination games. demonstrate concern the we elicit and money predict changes in behavior across several variants of dictator game, including data from a novel experiment prior published laboratory studies, are unaccounted by most current theories preferences. Moreover, find importance norm compliance monetary considerations is fairly constant different experiments. This consistency allows...

We use laboratory experiments to explore merger failure due conflicting organizational cultures. introduce a paradigm for studying culture that captures several key elements of the phenomenon. In our experiments, we allow subjects in “firms” develop culture, and then merge two firms. As expected, performance decreases following merging addition, overestimate merged firm attribute decrease members other rather than situational difficulties created by culture.

Individuals sort into and out of economic environments based on their preferences in response to relative prices. We demonstrate the importance such sorting for measurement social preferences, using two laboratory experiments. First, allowing subjects avoid which sharing is possible significantly reduces sharing. This reveals existence a type individual who shares reluctantly, preferring opportunity share. Second, after subsidizing environment, aggregate amount shared increases, but less...

Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which repeatedly either decide how much money share with a recipient hire agents make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and many cases close...

There is a growing body of evidence that many entrepreneurs seem to enter and persist in entrepreneurship despite earning low risk-adjusted returns. This has lead attempts provide explanations—using both standard economic theory behavioral economics— for why certain individuals may be attracted such an apparently unprofitable activity. Drawing on research economics, the sections follow, we review three sets possible interpretations understanding empirical facts related entry into,...

Abstract This article studies socially responsible behavior in markets. We develop a laboratory product market which low-cost production creates negative externality for third parties, but where alternative with higher costs mitigates the externality. Our first study, conducted Switzerland, reveals persistent preference among many consumers and firms avoiding social impact market, reflected both composition of types price premium products. Socially is generally robust to varying...

Research yields ample evidence that individual's behavior often reflects an apparent concern for moral considerations. A natural way to interpret of such motives using economic framework is add argument the utility function agents obtain both from outcomes yield only personal benefits and acting kindly, honestly, or according some other notion “right.” Indeed, interpretations can account much existing empirical evidence. However, a growing body research at intersection psychology economics...

Leadership theories in sociology and psychology argue that effective leaders influence follower behavior not only through the design of incentives institutions, but also personal abilities to persuade motivate. Although charismatic leadership has received considerable attention management literature, existing research yet established causal evidence for an effect leader charisma on performance incentivized economically relevant situations. We report from field laboratory experiments...

This paper reports the results of experiments which examine attributions leadership quality. Subjects played an abstract coordination game is like many organizational problems. Previous research showed that when larger groups play game, they rarely coordinate on Pareto-optimal (efficient) outcome, but small almost always efficient outcome. After two or three periods playing one subject who was randomly selected from among participants to be “leader” for experiment instructed make a speech...

Previous experiments using the minimum-effort coordination game reveal a striking regularity—large groups never coordinate efficiently. Given frequency with which large real-world groups, such as firms, face similarly difficult problems, this poses an important question: Why do we observe large, successfully coordinated in real world when they are so to create laboratory? This paper presents one reason. The show that, even though efficient does not occur that start off efficiently can be...

How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of good. Analysis experimental data suggests result is primarily due selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who not implement contribution outcomes. However, we also observe outcomes which a minimum winning coalition exploits contributions...

We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., turnaround. compare communication from incentive increases and also randomly selected elected leaders. Although all interventions yield shifts equilibria, has greater effect than incentives. Moreover, who are by followers significantly better at improving their group’s outcome The improved results sending performance-relevant messages. Our evidence that way in which...

Although monitoring and regulation can be used to combat socially costly unethical conduct, their intended targets often avoid or hide behavior. This surrenders at least part of the effectiveness regulatory policies firms' individuals' decisions voluntarily submit regulation. We study thus enhance ability engage in conduct. conduct a laboratory experiment which participants competitive task decide between having opportunity misreport performance verified by an external monitor. To effect...

We study whether leaders influence the unethical conduct of followers. To avoid selection issues present in natural environments, we use an experiment which create simple laboratory firms and assign leadership roles at random. In our first experiment, engage competition behavior enhances firm earnings but produces a negative externality for all firms. vary, by treatment, two instruments through can follower conduct—prominent statements to group allocation monetary incentives. find that...

There is substantial evidence that women tend to support different policies and political candidates than men. Many studies also document gender differences in a variety of important preference dimensions, such as risk-taking, competition pro-sociality. However, the degree which differential voting by men related these gaps more basic preferences requires an improved understanding. We conduct experiment individuals small laboratory "societies" repeatedly vote for redistribution engage...

Abstract Previous research in economics, social psychology, and sociology has produced compelling evidence that norms influence behavior. In this paper we apply the Krupka Weber (2013) norm elicitation procedure present U.S. non-U.S. born subjects with two scenarios for which tipping punctuality are known to vary across countries. We elicit shared beliefs by having match appropriateness ratings of different actions (such as arriving late or on time) another randomly selected participant from...