We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These determined by equity grants made several years prior and thus unlikely be driven the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative nor nondiscretionary news. News releases fall month before after month. generates a temporary stock prices market liquidity, CEO exploits cashing out...

Investors have limited and time-varying attention. These constraints are heterogeneous across investors, which can create asymmetric information adverse selection problems. We show how firms take these into account: They release harder-to-process news in periods when investor attention is higher. use an institutional discontinuity within the U.S. corporate filing system to measure effects. Filings before 5:30 p.m. become available immediately, whereas filings after only visible next morning...

Voting outcomes can differ from underlying preferences due to selection into voting. One source of such is lower participation shareholders with popular (free-rider effect) relative that those unpopular (underdog effect). We illustrate these strategic effects in a rational choice model which the voting decision depends on probability being pivotal and costs benefits Based model, we structurally estimate unobservable shareholder US data. show relevant: 13% governance proposals represent minority.

We study the role of contractual time horizon chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term contracts, we show that remaining under contract predicts turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, is more likely sensitive performance. also a positive within-CEO relation between firm risk. Our results similar across short long driven neither by or survival, nor technological cycles. They consistent with incentives...

We study the relation between innovation quality and managerial time horizon, measured by remaining until end of fixed-term CEO employment contracts. Firms with longer horizons produce more important on average: one additional year in horizon is associated 8% patent citations. Long-horizon CEOs also increase R&D, design exploratory strategies, hire inventors, set longer-term incentives for researchers. provide suggestive evidence that contracts affect decisions, using exogenous restrictions...

We document incentive effects of the evaluation deadlines in UK's performance-based research funding system. Studying 3,597,272 publications by UK researchers, we find that just before assessment obtain substantially fewer citations and are published venues with lower impact factors. These trends reverse abruptly after deadlines. discuss different factors contribute to this observation provide evidence likely set incentives against investment quality long-term topics. conclude where such...

We study right offerings around the world, using a sample of 8,238 rights offers announced during 1995-2008 in 69 countries. Although shareholders prefer having option to trade rights, issuers deliberately restrict tradability 38% offerings. argue that firms trading order avoid execution risk associated with strict prospectus requirements, prolonged and uncertain transaction process, potentially negative information signalled via price traded rights. In line this argument, we find...

We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative nor non-discretionary news. News releases fall month before after month. generates a temporary stock prices market liquidity, CEO exploits cashing out...

Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access this page indefinitely Copy URL DOI

This paper uses a new data set of 3,954 US CEO employment agreements to study their contractual time horizon. Longer contracts offer protection against dismissals: turnover probability increases by 12% each year closer expiration. should encourage CEOs pursue long-term projects, and with more indeed invest more. However, because longer make it harder dismiss managers, they also impose less discipline. Consistent this argument, horizon receive salary increases. Overall, firm value does not...

This paper uses a new data set of 3,954 US CEO employment agreements to study their contractual time horizon. Longer contracts offer protection against dismissals: turnover probability increases by 12% each year closer expiration. should encourage CEOs pursue long-term projects, and with more indeed invest more. However, because longer make it harder dismiss managers, they also impose less discipline. Consistent this argument, horizon receive salary increases. Overall, firm value does not...

We study the role of contractual time horizon CEOs for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term contracts, we show that remaining under contract predicts turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, is more likely sensitive performance. also a positive within-CEO relation between firm risk. Our results similar across short long driven neither by or survival, nor technological cycles. They consistent with incentives take long-term projects...

We study the value of stock liquidity in market for corporate control and show that target firm’s has an impact on transaction itself as well resulting merged entity. use a sample US M&A transactions 1987 through 2007 to acquiring more liquid firm makes acquirer liquid. This consequences activity pricing. Public acquirers are likely than private acquire targets. It also translates into greater likelihood completing deal higher compensation target.

This paper tests whether major changes in capital structure as a result of acquisitions, share repurchases and equity issues are consistent with the prediction empirical trade-off models structure. The answer is affirmative for acquisitions buybacks, but not issues. also asks deviations from predictions theory driven by market timing. Here “yes” all decisions, one qualification: issuing overvalued stock only possible if financing choice can be motivated theory.

This paper studies the strategic release of relevant corporate news in hours after market closure. We document new stylized facts about investor attention and trading opportunities, resulting three distinct after-Trading-Hours regimes. structure, combined with ample firm discretion intra-day timing, makes evening disclosures an ideal environment to study information. Firms strategically select when across sub-periods:

This paper studies the effects of horizon in CEO employment contracts on performance. It uses terms 1,018 to determine time U.S. CEOs. Firms with shorter trade at a discount firms longer contracts. An investment strategy that bought longest remaining contract and sold shortest would have earned 9.9% annual abnormal returns during sample period. is consistent argument short-term oriented CEOs sacrifice long-term firm value for maximization. Short also positive disciplining effect. When term...

Bidders have an incentive to pay with stock when their shares are overvalued, but target firms should be reluctant accept such overvalued payment. In a sample of 2,978 acquisitions, we find that payment is readily accepted only the bidder can justify financing decision in terms economic fundamentals as optimal capital structure. Yet even payment, paying cash more common. way, preclude undervalued and likely experience positive longterm excess returns.

We document incentive effects of the evaluation deadlines in UK's performance-based research funding system. Studying 3,597,272 publications by UK researchers, we find that just before assessment obtain substantially fewer citations and are published venues with lower impact factors. These trends reverse abruptly after deadlines. discuss different factors contribute to this observation provide evidence likely set incentives against investment quality long-term topics. conclude where such...

Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access this page indefinitely Copy URL DOI

Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access this page indefinitely Copy URL DOI