Allocation with Costly Verification under Ambiguity In “Distributionally Robust Optimal Verification,” Bayrak, Koçyiğit, Kuhn, and Pınar examine the mechanism design problem faced by a principal allocating single good to one of several agents costly verification without monetary transfers, adopting distributionally robust optimization perspective. Each agent desires generates value for principal, who does not initially know these values but can verify them at cost. This arises in various...

We study a mechanism design problem where seller aims to allocate good multiple bidders, each with private value. The supports or favors specific group, referred as the minority group. Specifically, requires that allocations group are at least predetermined fraction (equity level) of those made rest bidders. Such constraints arise in various settings, including government procurement and corporate supply chain policies prioritize small businesses, environmentally responsible suppliers,...

We study a mechanism design problem in which an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders for each of whom it has private value that unknown the seller and other bidders. The agents perceive ensemble all bidder values as random vector governed by ambiguous probability distribution, belongs commonly known ambiguity set. aims revenue-maximizing not only immunized against values, but also uncertainty about bidders’ attitude toward ambiguity. argue achieves this goal maximizing...

We study a robust auction design problem with minimax regret objective, in which seller seeks mechanism for selling multiple items to bidders additive values. The knows that the bidders’ values range over box uncertainty set but has no information on their probability distribution. model we requires distributional except upper bounds each item. This is relevant if there trustworthy or any costly time-consuming acquire. propose sells item separately via second price random reserve and prove...

AnadoluJet, a leading Turkish domestic airline carrier provides high-service, low-price flights to 28 locations within Turkey. Each winter and summer, AnadoluJet typically generates new flight schedule. The company’s primary scheduling concerns are aircraft fleet utilization the waiting times of transfer passengers. Balancing trade-off between these two criteria in schedule is crucial for AnadoluJet’s profitability. In this paper, we present results our study flight-scheduling process. We...

Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control is a fundamental paradigm that studied in various fields such as engineering, computer science, economics, and neuroscience. It involves controlling system with linear dynamics imperfect observations, subject to additive noise, the goal of minimizing quadratic cost function for state variables. In this work, we consider generalization discrete-time, finite-horizon LQG problem, where noise distributions are unknown belong Wasserstein ambiguity sets...

We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating single good to one several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires and uses it create value for principal. designate this as agent's private type. Even though does not know agents' types, she can verify them at cost. The allocation thus depends on self-declared types results any verification performed, principal's payoff matches her minus costs verification. It is known that if are independent, then...

This repository aims to showcase the effectiveness of our proposed regret-minimizing mechanism against various benchmark mechanisms.

We study a mechanism design problem where an indivisible good is auctioned to multiple bidders, for each of whom it has private value that unknown the seller and other bidders. The agents perceive ensemble all bidder values as random vector governed by ambiguous probability distribution, which belongs commonly known ambiguity set. aims revenue maximizing not only immunized against but also uncertainty about bidders' attitude towards ambiguity. argue achieves this goal worst-case expected...

We study a robust auction design problem with minimax regret objective, where seller seeks mechanism for selling multiple items to bidders additive values. The knows that the bidders’ values range over box uncertainty set but has no information on their probability distribution. model we requires distributional except upper bounds each item. This is relevant if there trust-worthy or any costly time-consuming acquire. propose sells item separately via second price random reserve and prove...

We study the problem of allocating scarce societal resources different types (e.g., permanent housing, deceased donor kidneys for transplantation, ventilators) to heterogeneous allocatees on a waitlist people experiencing homelessness, individuals suffering from end-stage renal disease, Covid-19 patients) based their observed covariates. leverage administrative data collected in deployment design an online policy that maximizes expected outcomes while satisfying budget constraints, long run....

We study a robust monopoly pricing problem with minimax regret objective, where seller endeavors to sell multiple goods single buyer, only knowing that the buyer's values for range over rectangular uncertainty set. interpret this as zero-sum game between seller, who chooses selling mechanism, and fictitious adversary or `nature', from within Using duality techniques rooted in optimization, we prove admits Nash equilibrium mixed strategies can be computed closed form. The strategy of is...

We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating single good to one several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires and uses it create value for principal. designate this as agent's private type. Even though does not know agents' types, she can verify them at cost. The allocation thus depends on self-declared types results any verification performed, principal's payoff matches her minus costs verification. It is known that if are independent, then...