Johann Graf Lambsdorff

ORCID: 0000-0002-5713-6991
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Corruption and Economic Development
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
  • Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Economic and Social Issues
  • Economic theories and models
  • Economic Growth and Development
  • Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
  • Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
  • Global Financial Crisis and Policies
  • Economic and Business Studies
  • Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
  • Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Economic Theory and Policy
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Economic Policies and Impacts
  • Ethics in Business and Education
  • Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Social Policy and Reform Studies
  • Political Conflict and Governance
  • Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Innovative Teaching and Learning Methods

University of Passau
2012-2024

University of Göttingen
1998-2002

10.1046/j.0023-5962.2003.00233.x article EN Kyklos 2003-11-01

Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently it made the subject sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop better understanding why corruption occurs and best policies combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced other factors such as opportunism their criminal counterparts danger acquiring an unreliable reputation....

10.5860/choice.45-0389 article EN Choice Reviews Online 2007-09-01

10.1023/a:1020320327526 article EN Public Choice 2002-01-01

10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00217-7 article EN Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2002-07-01

10.1007/s10101-002-0060-0 article EN Economics of Governance 2003-11-01

There is empirical evidence that investors’ confidence not only adversely affected by corruption but also the lack of predictability and accompanies corrupt deals. However, positive aspect this it acts as a deterrent to corruption. Empirical data provided here on cross–section countries proves in deals enhances further spread This suggests adverse effects cannot be avoided divesting its unpredictability.

10.1111/1536-7150.00194 article EN American Journal of Economics and Sociology 2002-10-01

10.1080/09578819808426701 article EN European Journal of Development Research 1998-06-01

10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.004 article EN Journal of Economic Psychology 2010-01-29

10.1016/j.irle.2011.04.002 article EN International Review of Law and Economics 2011-05-02
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