Pablo Rauzy

ORCID: 0000-0002-6293-3231
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
  • Cryptography and Data Security
  • Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
  • Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
  • Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
  • Cultural Insights and Digital Impacts
  • Access Control and Trust
  • Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
  • Advanced Memory and Neural Computing
  • Disaster Response and Management
  • Diverse multidisciplinary academic research
  • Linguistic and Sociocultural Studies
  • Restraint-Related Deaths
  • Auction Theory and Applications
  • Caching and Content Delivery
  • Ferroelectric and Negative Capacitance Devices
  • Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Cybersecurity and Information Systems
  • Game Theory and Applications
  • Linguistics and Discourse Analysis
  • User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Personal Information Management and User Behavior

Université Paris 8
2017-2024

Télécom Paris
2013-2015

Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l’Information
2013-2015

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
2014-2015

Institut Mines-Télécom
2013-2015

École Normale Supérieure - PSL
2011-2013

Hardware and software of secured embedded systems are prone to physical attacks. In particular, fault injection attacks revealed vulnerabilities on the data control flow allowing an attacker break cryptographic or algorithms implementations. While many research studies concentrated successful flow, only a few targets instruction flow. this paper, we focus electromagnetic (EMFI) especially cache. We target very widespread (smartphones, tablets, settop-boxes, health-industry monitors sensors,...

10.1109/hst.2015.7140238 preprint EN 2015-05-01

10.1007/s13389-013-0065-3 article EN Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2013-12-24

In this paper we study the existing CRT-RSA countermeasures against fault-injection attacks. an attempt to classify them get achieve deep understanding of how they work. We show that many (and their variations) actually share a number common features, but optimize in different ways. also there is no conceptual distinction between test-based and infective either one can be transformed into other. Furthermore, faults on code (skipping instructions) captured by considering only data. These...

10.1109/fdtc.2014.17 article EN Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography 2014-09-01

10.1007/s13389-015-0105-2 article EN Journal of Cryptographic Engineering 2015-06-23

In our paper at PROOFS 2013, we formally studied a few known countermeasures to protect CRT-RSA against the BellCoRe fault injection attack. However, left Vigilant's countermeasure and its alleged repaired version by Coron et al. as future work, because arithmetical framework of tool was not sufficiently powerful. this bridge gap then use same methodology study both versions countermeasure. We obtain surprising results, which believe demonstrate importance formal analysis in field...

10.1145/2556464.2556466 preprint EN 2014-01-22

While the control of individuals over their personal data is increasingly seen as an essential component privacy, word "control" usually used in a very vague way, both by lawyers and computer scientists. This lack precision may lead to misunderstandings makes it difficult check compliance. To address this issue, we propose formal framework based on capacities specify notion reason about properties. We illustrate our with social network systems show that possible characterize types they...

10.1145/3176258.3176314 preprint EN 2018-03-13
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