West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not knowwholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from to farmgate prices is negligible. When we informed in randomly chosen villages about prices, average sales were unaffected, but increased. These results can be explained by a model where bargain ex post with village middlemen, the outside option of selling village. They are inconsistent standard oligopolistic models pass-through, search...

Abstract We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two ways of delegating selection microcredit clients among smallholder farmers to local intermediaries: private trader (TRAIL), versus local–government appointee (GRAIL). Selected beneficiaries both schemes were equally likely take up and repay loans, experienced similar increases borrowing farm output. However profits increased unit costs production decreased significantly only TRAIL. While there is some evidence superior by ability...

Abstract This paper studies the link between self-image and behavior among those who face stigma due to poverty social exclusion. Using a randomized field experiment with sex workers in Kolkata (India), we examine whether psychological intervention mitigate adverse effects of internalized can induce change. We find significant improvements participants' self-image, their savings choices, health clinic visits. Administrative data confirm that these changes preventive persist 15 21 months...

In the Indian state of West Bengal, potato farmers sell to local middlemen because they lack direct access wholesale markets. high-frequency farmer marketing surveys we find that are poorly informed about and retail prices, there is a large gap between farmgate prices. To test alternative models farmer-middlemen trades, conduct field experiment providing in randomly chosen villages with market price information. Information provision had negligible average effects on sales revenues, but...

We argue, in a model with trade and unemployment, that exogenous inflow of foreign capital may deliver the desired result when it flows to protected intermediate‐goods sector. Whether investment should be directed towards an sector or final‐goods depends on technological specifications either type goods as well existing set policies.

We carry out a randomized controlled experiment in West Bengal, India to test three separate performance pay treatments the public health sector. Performance is judged on improvements child malnutrition. First, we exogenously change wages of government employed care workers through basic level absolute incentives. The second treatment introduces high Finally, also for impact relative incentives health. All include supplying mothers with recipe books. Overall, results suggest that reduce...

It has been argued that since 2014, under the BJP-led central government, welfare benefits in India have become better targeted and less prone to clientelistic control by state local governments. Arguably this helped increase vote share of BJP vis-a-vis regional parties. We test these hypotheses using longitudinal data from 3500 rural households West Bengal. fail find evidence new "central" programs introduced after 2014 were than traditional "state" programs, or targeting improved 2014....

We carry out a randomized controlled experiment in West Bengal, India to test three separate performance pay treatments the public health sector. Performance is judged on improvements child malnutrition. exogenously change wages of government employed care workers through either absolute or relative incentives. also for impact high and low Results show that incentives reduce severe malnutrition by 6.3 percentage points over months. Result consistent with reported increase protein-rich diet...

We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), was randomly selected established private trader, while in Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending (GRAIL), he chosen from nominations by elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates similar, and had larger average impacts on borrowers' farm incomes. The majority this difference is due to...

We examine the distributive impacts of two alternative approaches to deliver agricultural credit smallholders: TRAIL (or trader-agent intermediated lending), where local traders recommend village residents for individual liability micro-leans, and GBL group-based households self-select into groups receive joint loans. use data from a field experiment in eastern India estimate how effects these schemes differ by economic (proxied landownership) social caste religion) status households. Our...