A5034823729- Water resources management and optimization
- Economic theories and models
- Water Systems and Optimization
- Land Rights and Reforms
- Urban Stormwater Management Solutions
- Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Water-Energy-Food Nexus Studies
- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
- Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
- Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Marine and fisheries research
- Housing Market and Economics
- Transboundary Water Resource Management
- French Urban and Social Studies
- Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Property Rights and Legal Doctrine
- Water Governance and Infrastructure
- Fish Ecology and Management Studies
- Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
- Sex work and related issues
- Economic Policies and Impacts
- International Development and Aid
- Political Economy and Marxism
Aix-Marseille Université
2012-2022
École des hautes études en sciences sociales
2014-2022
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
2014-2022
University of California, Santa Barbara
2021-2022
Centrale Marseille
2015-2022
Institut Agro Montpellier
2022
Université de Montpellier
2022
National Bureau of Economic Research
2021
Center for Environmental Economics - Montpellier
2021
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d’Aix-Marseille
2010-2017
Rareté de l’eau et conflits inter-étatiques Cette étude analyse le risque qu’un conflit survienne entre des pays partageant une même source d’approvisionnement en eau. Alors qu’une controverse subsiste sur la réalité tel éclate, cette montre qu’il existe un intervalle négociation dont taille dépend disponibilité ressource eau ainsi que l’asymétrie les matière capacité productive. Cet est assimilé à probabilité y ait autour commune, celle étant décroissante avec l’intervalle négociation. Nous...
We analyze theoretically an institution called a "limited-tenure concession" for its ability to induce efficient public goods contribution and common-pool resource extraction.The basic idea is that by limiting the tenure over which agent can enjoy good, but offering possibility of renewal contingent on ample private provision may be induced.We first show in simple repeated game setting limited-tenure concessions incentivize socially-efficient goods.We then this instrument best natural...