Journal Article Monty Hall drives a wedge between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: reply to Bovens Get access Luc Bovens, Department of Philosophy, Logic Scientific Method London School Economics Political Science London, WC2A2AE UK L.Bovens@LSE.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar José Luis Ferreira Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Madrid, 126, 28903 Getafe Spain jlferr@eco.uc3m.es Analysis, Volume 70, Issue 3, July 2010, Pages 473–481,...

We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple markets. find that two periods yields competitive outcomes results are very close to predicted theoretical for quantity setting duopolies quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support hypothesis markets enhancing. then a new market allows endogenously determined indefinitely many only when sellers coordinate on zero amount market. under an endogenous rule also...

Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue recognition-seeking will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and these still more stringent if the value appears utility function scientists, either directly or instrumentally.

We introduce the possibility of unilaterally giving profits away to rival in different oligopolistic contexts. find that this strategy may be profitable some circumstances, thus providing a context for partial tacit collusion one‐shot interactions. Although itself look unrealistic, we argue it hidden behind more complicated relation firms.

The surprise exam paradox has attracted the attention of prominent logicians, mathematicians and philosophers for decades. Although itself been resolved at least since Quine (1953 Quine, W. V. O. 1953. “On a So‐Called Paradox,”. Mind, 62: 65–67. [Google Scholar]), some aspects it are still being discussed. In this paper we propose, following Sober (1998 Sober, E. 1998. “To Give Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory,”. Synthese, 115: 355–373. to translate into language game theory clarify these...

Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is clear advantage in moving first. In thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas context forward induction three classic games, namely, outside option game, game burning dollar before battle sexes and beer-quiche game.