Delphine Samuels

ORCID: 0000-0002-9867-936X
Publications
Citations
Views
---
Saved
---
About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
  • Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
  • Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Public Procurement and Policy
  • Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
  • Credit Risk and Financial Regulations
  • Auction Theory and Applications
  • Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Local Government Finance and Decentralization
  • Legal and Constitutional Studies
  • Corruption and Economic Development
  • Higher Education Governance and Development
  • Housing Market and Economics
  • Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting
  • Regulation and Compliance Studies
  • Criminal Law and Evidence
  • Economic and Environmental Valuation
  • Accounting and Organizational Management
  • Financial Reporting and XBRL
  • Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

University of Chicago
2015-2023

New School
2020

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2020

University of Pennsylvania
2016

ABSTRACT The government requires its suppliers to have certain internal information processes reduce uncertainty about their ability fulfill commitments. I argue that these requirements improve suppliers' information, which leads better external reporting. Using a dataset of U.S. contracts, find positive relation between contract awards and firms' reporting quality. Consistent with procurement-related driving this relation, firms when they begin contracting the government, magnitude...

10.2308/tar-2018-0343 article EN The Accounting Review 2020-02-27

ABSTRACT We examine how open procurement data affect the competitiveness of award procedures and execution government contracts. The European Union recently made its historical notices available for bulk download in a cohesive user‐friendly database. Comparing contracts above below EU size thresholds, we find that, after initiative, officials are more likely to treated through bidding. In cross‐sectional analyses, document variation bidding effect consistent with two underlying mechanisms:...

10.1111/1475-679x.12479 article EN Journal of Accounting Research 2023-04-04

This study develops and tests a simple model of voluntary disclosure in which managers can choose to withhold (i.e., redact) certain elements from mandatory disclosure. We consider setting is disaggregated (e.g., financial statement), an aggregate earnings forecast), the costs each type are distinct. In this setting, we show that endogenously substitute between two types disclosure; information more likely provide test our predictions using comprehensive sample disclosures SEC allows firm...

10.1287/mnsc.2022.4549 article EN Management Science 2022-09-29

ABSTRACT This paper examines how credit rating levels affect municipal debt issuers’ disclosure decisions. Using exogenous upgrades in caused by the recalibration of Moody's ratings scale 2010, we find that upgraded municipalities significantly reduce their required continuing financial information, relative to unaffected municipalities. Consistent with a reduction debtholders’ demand for information driving these results, is greater when bonds are held investors who relied more on ex ante....

10.1111/1475-679x.12307 article EN Journal of Accounting Research 2020-04-15

A growing literature documents that complex financial statements negatively affect the information environment. In this paper, we examine whether managers use voluntary disclosure to mitigate these negative effects. Employing cross-sectional and within-firm designs, find a robust positive relation between statement complexity disclosure. This is stronger when liquidity decreases around filing of statements, firms have more outside monitors, weaker poor performance greater earnings...

10.2139/ssrn.2564350 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2015-01-01

This study develops and tests a simple model of voluntary disclosure where managers can choose to withhold (i.e., redact) certain elements from mandatory disclosure. We consider setting is disaggregated (e.g., financial statement), an aggregate earnings forecast), the costs each type are distinct. In this setting, we show that endogenously substitute between two types disclosure—managers chose information more likely provide test our predictions using comprehensive sample disclosures SEC...

10.2139/ssrn.3173664 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2018-01-01

This paper reviews the empirical methods used in accounting literature to draw causal inferences. Similar other social science disciplines, recent years have seen a burgeoning growth use of that seek provide as-if random variation observational settings—i.e., "quasi-experiments." We synthesis major assumptions these methods, discuss several practical considerations for such and framework thinking about whether when quasi-experimental non-experimental are well-suited drawing caution against...

10.2139/ssrn.3935088 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2021-01-01

We examine how open procurement data affect the competitiveness of award procedures and execution government contracts. The European Union recently made its historical notices available for bulk download in a cohesive user-friendly database. Comparing contracts above below EU size thresholds, we find that, after initiative, officials are more likely to treated through bidding. In cross-sectional analyses, document variation bidding effect consistent with two underlying mechanisms: (i)...

10.2139/ssrn.3483868 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2019-01-01

The government requires its suppliers to have certain internal information processes reduce uncertainty about their ability fulfill commitments. I argue that these requirements improve suppliers’ information, which leads better external reporting. Using a dataset of U.S. contracts, find positive relation between contract awards and firms’ reporting quality. Consistent with procurement-related driving this relation, firms when they begin contracting the government, magnitude improvement...

10.2139/ssrn.3197640 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2018-01-01

This paper examines how the ex ante level of public scrutiny influences a manager’s subsequent decision to misreport. The conventional wisdom is that high levels facilitate monitoring, suggesting negative relation between and misreporting. However, also increases weight investors place on earnings in valuing firm. turn benefit misreporting, positive relation. We formalize these two countervailing forces––"monitoring" "valuation"––in context parsimonious model show combination forces leads...

10.2139/ssrn.3157222 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2018-01-01

This paper examines how credit rating levels affect municipal debt issuers' disclosure decisions. Using exogenous upgrades in caused by the recalibration of Moody's ratings scale 2010, we find that upgraded municipalities significantly reduce their required continuing financial information, relative to unaffected municipalities. Consistent with a reduction debtholders' demand for information driving these results, is greater when bonds are held investors who relied more on ex ante. However,...

10.2139/ssrn.3153143 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2018-01-01

We examine how amnesty-based regulatory initiatives affect compliance in the context of SEC's 2014 Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation initiative (MCDC). In an effort to increase transparency municipal debt market, MCDC granted favorable settlement terms municipal-debt issuers and underwriters that voluntarily self-reported having violated SEC disclosure-related anti-fraud provisions. find only those entities likely perceived there be a significant, punitive ex-post enforcement...

10.2139/ssrn.4228284 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2022-01-01
Coming Soon ...