Journal Article Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence Get access Giacomo Bonanno Nuffield College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 54, Issue 1, January 1987, Pages 37–45, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297444 Published: 01 1987 history Received: July 1985 Accepted: June 1986

For the past 20 years or so literature on noncooperative games has been centered search for an equilibrium concept that expresses notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet this is if a “rational solution” exists, it must be Nash . The consensus view, however, not all equilibria can accepted as solutions. Consider, example, game Figure 1.

Building on the analysis of Bonanno (Artificial Intelligence, 2025) we introduce a simple modal logic containing three operators: unimodal belief operator, bimodal conditional operator and global operator. For each AGM axiom for revision, provide corresponding axiom. The correspondence is as follows: characterized by property Kripke-Lewis frames considered in and, turn, that characterizes proposed

Abstract. This survey is organized as follows. I. Introduction. II. The main issues. III. Negishi's model. IV. Objective demand in the Cournot‐Nash framework. V. Bertrand‐Nash VI. assumption of quasi‐concavity profit functions. VII. Compromises between conjectural and objective approach. VIII. Insights into notion perfect competition. IX. Conclusion.

Journal Article Vertical Restraints in a Model of Differentiation Get access Patrick Bolton, Bolton Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Giacomo Bonanno California, Davis The Quarterly Economics, Volume 103, Issue 3, August 1988, Pages 555–570, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885545 Published: 01 1988

Abstract We investigate an axiomatization of the notion common belief (knowledge) that makes use no rules inference (apart from Modus Ponens and Necessitation) highlight property set accessibility relations characterizes each axiom. Mathematics Subject Classification: 03B45, 68T25.

Two views of game theory are discussed: (1) as a description the behavior rational individuals who recognize each other's reationality and reasoning abilities, (2) an internally consistent recommendation to on how act in interactive situations. It is shown that same mathematical tool, namely modal logic, can be used explicitly model both views.

This paper investigates the existence of oligopoly equilibria when firms arrive, through local price experiments, at a correct estimation their demand curves in neighborhood given statu s quo. The author provides sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium, defined as point where each firm is maximum its profit function, prices charged by th e other firms. He also two examples, one duopoly with l ocal but no and duopol y equilibria. Copyright 1988 Economics Department University Pennsylvania...