A5051710040- Corporate Finance and Governance
- Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
- Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
- Economic Growth and Development
- Risk Management in Financial Firms
- Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Family Business Performance and Succession
- FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance
- Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
Wuhan University
2024
Fudan University
2021-2022
SUMMARY We investigate the chief audit executive's (CAE) internal supervisory role by examining change in monitoring effectiveness following turnover of CAEs. Using a sample firms listed on small and medium enterprise board China's stock exchange, we find that CAE is accompanied reduction financial reporting/internal control quality more pronounced for whose successor CAEs have lower expertise than their predecessors. Further analysis shows negative association with stronger when personal...
ABSTRACT This paper examines the demand difference in chief audit executive (CAE) competence between family and nonfamily firms whether CAE plays a role mitigating agency problems owners executives within firms. Using sample of Chinese listed on small medium enterprise board, we find that is higher than The more prominent when ownership dispersion among members less CEO one members. Moreover, members’ financial background reinforces social identity thus increases their for competent CAEs....
This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects executive compensation contracts. Using sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find significant positive relation CAE duality pay‐for‐performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources reduces agency costs. is more pronounced when companies face stricter environment...