Deborah G. Mayo

ORCID: 0000-0001-8252-9968
Publications
Citations
Views
---
Saved
---
About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Philosophy and History of Science
  • Statistics Education and Methodologies
  • Science and Climate Studies
  • Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
  • Statistical Methods in Clinical Trials
  • Risk Perception and Management
  • Probability and Statistical Research
  • Historical Economic and Social Studies
  • Advanced Statistical Methods and Models
  • Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Statistical Mechanics and Entropy
  • Mental Health Research Topics
  • Forecasting Techniques and Applications
  • Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
  • Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies
  • Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
  • Race, Genetics, and Society
  • Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
  • American Constitutional Law and Politics
  • Data Analysis with R

Virginia Tech
2013-2023

Cambridge University Press
2010

Philosophy of Science Association
1995

Hydro One (Canada)
1990

Daniël Lakens Federico Adolfi Casper J. Albers Farid Anvari Matthew A J Apps and 83 more Shlomo Argamon Thom Baguley Raymond Becker Stephen D. Benning Daniel E. Bradford Erin Michelle Buchanan Aaron R. Caldwell Ben Van Calster Rickard Carlsson Sau-Chin Chen Bryan Chung Lincoln Colling Gary S. Collins Zander Crook Emily S. Cross Sameera Daniels Henrik Danielsson Lisa M. DeBruine Daniel J. Dunleavy Brian D. Earp Michele I. Feist Jason D. Ferrell James G. Field Nicholas W. Fox Amanda Friesen Caio Gomes Mónica González-Márquez James A. Grange Andrew P. Grieve Robert Guggenberger James T. Grist Anne‐Laura van Harmelen Fred Hasselman Kevin D. Hochard Mark R. Hoffarth Nicholas P. Holmes Michael Ingre Peder Mortvedt Isager Hanna K. Isotalus Christer Johansson Konrad Juszczyk David A. Kenny Ahmed A. Khalil Barbara Konat Junpeng Lao Erik Gahner Larsen Gerine M. A. Lodder Jiří Lukavský Christopher R. Madan David Manheim Stephen R. Martin Andrea E. Martin Deborah G. Mayo Randy J. McCarthy Kevin McConway Colin McFarland Amanda Q. X. Nio Gustav Nilsonne Cilene Lino de Oliveira Jean‐Jacques Orban de Xivry Sam Parsons Gerit Pfuhl Kimberly A. Quinn John J. Sakon S. Adil Sarıbay Iris K. Schneider Manojkumar Selvaraju Zsuzsika Sjoerds Samuel G. Smith Tim Smits Jeffrey R. Spies Vishnu Sreekumar Crystal N. Steltenpohl Neil Stenhouse Wojciech Świątkowski Miguel A. Vadillo Marcel A. L. M. van Assen Matt N Williams Samantha E. Williams Donald R. Williams Tal Yarkoni Ignazio Ziano Rolf A. Zwaan

10.1038/s41562-018-0311-x article EN Nature Human Behaviour 2018-02-26

Despite the widespread use of key concepts Neyman–Pearson (N–P) statistical paradigm—type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels—they have been subject philosophical controversy debate for over 60 years. Both current long-standing problems N–P tests stem from unclarity confusion, even among adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are be used (post-data) inductive inference opposed behavior. We argue that relevance is ensure only hypotheses passed...

10.1093/bjps/axl003 article EN The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2006-04-12

10.1177/016224397800300313 article EN Newsletter on Science Technology & Human Values 1978-06-01

While many philosophers of science have accorded special evidential significance to tests whose results are “novel facts”, there continues be disagreement over both the definition novelty and why it should matter. The view favored by Giere, Lakatos, Worrall others is that use-novelty : An accordance between evidence e hypothesis h provides a genuine test only if not used in 's construction. I argue what lies behind intuition matters deeper severe set out criterion severity akin notion test's...

10.1086/289639 article EN Philosophy of Science 1991-12-01

The growing availability of computer power and statistical software has greatly increased the ease with which practitioners apply methods, but this not been accompanied by attention to checking assumptions on these methods are based. At same time, disagreements about inferences based research frequently revolve around whether actually met in studies available, e.g., psychology, ecology, biology, risk assessment. Philosophical scrutiny can help disentangle ‘practical’ problems model...

10.1086/425064 article EN Philosophy of Science 2004-12-01

While the common procedure of statistical significance testing and its accompanying concept p-values have long been surrounded by controversy, renewed concern has triggered replication crisis in science. Many blame tests themselves, some regard them as sufficiently damaging to scientific practice warrant being abandoned. We take a contrary position, arguing that central criticisms arise from misunderstanding misusing tools, fact purported remedies themselves risk argue banning use p-value...

10.1007/s11229-022-03692-0 article EN cc-by Synthese 2022-05-12

The error statistical account of testing uses considerations, not to provide a measure probability hypotheses, but model patterns irregularity that are useful for controlling, distinguishing, and learning from errors. aim this paper is (1) explain the main points contrast between subjective Bayesian approach (2) elucidate key errors underlie central objection raised by Colin Howson at our PSA 96 Symposium.

10.1086/392600 article EN Philosophy of Science 1997-01-01

While orthodox (Neyman-Pearson) statistical tests enjoy widespread use in science, the philosophical controversy over their appropriateness for obtaining scientific knowledge remains unresolved. I shall suggest an explanation and a resolution of this controversy. The source controversy, argue, is that are typically interpreted as rules making optimal decisions to how behave –-where optimality measured by frequency errors test would commit long series trials. Most philosophers statistics,...

10.1086/289272 article EN Philosophy of Science 1985-12-01

An essential component of inference based on familiar frequentist notions, such as $p$-values, significance and confidence levels, is the relevant sampling distribution. This feature results in violations a principle known strong likelihood (SLP), focus this paper. In particular, if outcomes $\mathbf{x}^{\ast }$ $\mathbf{y}^{\ast from experiments $E_{1}$ $E_{2}$ (both with unknown parameter $\theta $) have different probability models $f_{1}(\cdot)$, $f_{2}(\cdot)$, then even though...

10.1214/13-sts457 article EN other-oa Statistical Science 2014-05-01

The key problem in the controversy over group selection is that of defining a criterion identifies distinct causal process irreducible to individual selection. We aim clarify this and formulate an adequate model distinguish two types models, labeling them type I II models. Type models are invoked explain differences among groups their respective rates production contained individuals. new groups. Taking Elliott Sober's as exemplar, we argue although have some biological importance—they force...

10.1086/289403 article EN Philosophy of Science 1987-12-01

Recently, a number of statistical reformers have argued for conceptualizing significance testing as analogous to diagnostic testing, with "base rate" true nulls and test's error probabilities used compute "positive predictive value" or "false discovery rate". These quantities are critique scientific practice. We argue against this; these not relevant evaluating tests, they add the confusion over take focus away from what matters: evidence.

10.31219/osf.io/ps38b article EN 2017-07-26
Coming Soon ...