Shengwei Zhou

ORCID: 0000-0001-9739-1308
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About
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Research Areas
  • Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Auction Theory and Applications
  • Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
  • Traffic Prediction and Management Techniques
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Autonomous Vehicle Technology and Safety
  • Optimization and Variational Analysis
  • Video Surveillance and Tracking Methods
  • Photoacoustic and Ultrasonic Imaging
  • Optimization and Search Problems
  • Advanced SAR Imaging Techniques
  • Economic theories and models
  • Image Processing Techniques and Applications
  • Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research
  • Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
  • Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Free Will and Agency
  • Advanced Algebra and Logic
  • Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs

Xidian University
2024

University of Macau
2022-2023

City University of Macau
2022

The accurate trajectory prediction of surrounding vehicles is crucial for the sustainability and safety connected autonomous under mixed traffic streams in real world. task challenging because there are all kinds factors affecting motions vehicles, such as individual movements, ambient driving environment especially road conditions, interactions with neighboring vehicles. To resolve above issues, this work proposes a novel Heterogeneous Context-Aware Graph Convolutional Networks following...

10.1109/tits.2022.3173944 article EN IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems 2022-05-24

We study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores group agents, where each agent i ∈ N has an additive cost function ci and non-negative weight wi that represents its obligation for undertaking the chores. consider fairness notion weighted envy-freeness up one item (WEF1), which requires ci(Xi \ {e})/wi after removing most costly e is at ci(Xj)/wj any other j. While WEF1 allocations goods can be computed in polynomial time (Chakraborty et al. TEAC 2021), existence still open...

10.1145/3580507.3597763 article EN 2023-07-07

10.1016/j.artint.2023.104037 article EN Artificial Intelligence 2023-11-07

In this paper we study how to fairly allocate a set of m indivisible chores group n agents, each which has general additive cost function on the items. Since envy-free (EF) allocation is not guaranteed exist, consider notion envy-freeness up any item (EFX). contrast fruitful results regarding (approximation of) EFX allocations for goods, very little known chores. Prior our work, chores, it that always exist two or number agents with identical ordering functions. For instances, no non-trivial...

10.24963/ijcai.2022/110 article EN Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2022-07-01

In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate a set of m indivisible chores group n agents, each which has general additive cost function on the items. Since envy-free (EF) allocations are not guaranteed exist, consider notion envy-freeness up any item (EFX). contrast fruitful results regarding (approximation of) EFX for goods, very little is known allocation chores. Prior our work, chores, it that always exist two agents or number with identical ordering functions. For instances, no...

10.48550/arxiv.2109.07313 preprint EN other-oa arXiv (Cornell University) 2021-01-01

We study the problem of allocating a group indivisible chores among agents while each chore has binary marginal. focus on fairness criteria envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and investigate existence EFX allocations. show that when have additive cost functions, there exist Pareto-optimal (PO) allocations can be computed in polynomial time. To best our knowledge, this is first setting general number admits PO allocations, before which only been shown for three bivalued agents. further...

10.48550/arxiv.2308.12177 preprint EN other-oa arXiv (Cornell University) 2023-01-01

We consider the problem of fair allocation $m$ indivisible items to a group $n$ agents with subsidy (money). Our work mainly focuses on chores but most our results extend goods as well. case when have (general) additive cost functions. Assuming that maximum an item agent can be compensated by one dollar, we show total $n/4$ dollars suffices ensure proportional allocation. Moreover, is tight in sense there exists instance for which every requires at least $n/4$. also weighted and $(n-1)/2$

10.48550/arxiv.2307.04411 preprint EN other-oa arXiv (Cornell University) 2023-01-01
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