This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These span the standard categories: static and dynamic with complete incomplete information. For each game, treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In case, however, change payoff structure produces large inconsistency between theoretical observed behavior. contradictions generally consistent simple intuition based on interaction asymmetries...

Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma? by C. Monica Capra, Jacob K. Goeree, Rosario Gomez and Charles A. Holt. Published volume 89, issue 3, pages 678-690 of American Economic Review, June 1999

Journal Article Self-Correcting Information Cascades Get access Jacob K. Goeree, Goeree California Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Thomas R. Palfrey, Palfrey Brian W. Rogers, Rogers Northwestern University Richard D. McKelvey The Review Economic Studies, Volume 74, Issue 3, July 2007, Pages 733–762, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x Published: 01 2007 history Received: December 2004 Accepted: August 2006

We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds unanimity). Without deliberation, different generate significantly outcomes, tracking theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation, however, diminishes institutional differences uniformly improves efficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols...

We show that standard winner‐pay auctions are inept fund‐raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another's high bid. Revenues suppressed as a result and remain finite even when value dollar donated same kept. This problem does not occur in lotteries all‐pay auctions, where pay irrespective whether win. introduce general class rank their revenues, illustrate how dominate formats. The optimal mechanism is an auction augmented with entry fee reserve price.

We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics with experimental observations from dictator games. Dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance, giving follows a simple inverse distance law. While student demographics play minor role in explaining offer amounts, heterogeneity is important for network formation. In particular, we detect significant homophilous behavior; students connect to others similar themselves. Moreover, the reveal strong...

We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy delivers the same interim expected all agents ex ante surplus. The short proof is based on extension of elegant result due to Gutmann, Kemperman, Reeds, Shepp (1991). also show equivalence between implementation generally breaks down when main assumptions underlying model...

The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. equilibrium bid distribution is fixed point: belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal choice determined by payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast Nash equilibrium, comparative statics are intuitive: rent dissipation increases number players cost. Overdissipation rents impossible under full...

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. paper reports such an stylised model which bidders receive signal independent signal. We show that more uncertainty about the negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by seller decreases uncertainty, raises efficiency seller's revenues. Efficiency revenues are also higher when enter auction.

Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure degree inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey winner's curse, they weigh their information in roughly same manner as rational bidders, observed efficiencies close predicted levels. Increased competition reduced uncertainty about positively affect revenues...

This paper characterizes behavior with “noisy” decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics other theoretical properties “quantal response” equilibrium, resulting predictions are compared Nash equilibria that arise in limiting...

This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible package bidding format developed by FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, interest policy makers auctions is justified data. When value complementarities are present, yields improved performance. We find clear differences among auction formats both terms efficiency and seller revenue, however. Notably, clock provides highest revenue. The FCC's performed worse than alternatives,...