Shaphan Ng

ORCID: 0000-0002-4745-1824
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
  • Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
  • Corporate Finance and Governance

Singapore Management University
2020-2024

University of California, Irvine
2020

ABSTRACT We examine whether employee perceptions of managers and firms fall following tax avoidance news. Using S&P 500 generalized difference-in-differences specifications, we find that news negatively affects firms. In cross-sectional tests, (1) in consumer-facing industries suffer larger employee-related perception changes from compared to other firms, (2) well-performing their face smaller than managers. Overall, our results are consistent with affecting

10.2308/tar-2019-0148 article EN The Accounting Review 2020-08-06

In this study, we provide evidence on the effects of state tax whistleblower laws. We exploit a novel 2010 amendment to New York’s False Claims Acts (FCA) that explicitly extended incentives corporate income whistleblowers. identify treated firms (firms exposed FCA) using establishment-level data and descriptive analyses. Using sample York neighboring states, find FCA reduced avoidance. cross-sectional tests, are increasing in grant fewer employee stock options industry regulation,...

10.1287/mnsc.2023.02999 article EN Management Science 2024-08-14

We examine whether employee perceptions of managers and firms fall following tax avoidance news. Using S&P 500 generalized difference-in-differences specifications, we find that news negatively affects firms. In cross-sectional tests, (1) in consumer-facing industries suffer larger employee-related perception changes from compared to other firms, (2) well-performing their face smaller than managers. Overall, our results are consistent with affecting

10.2139/ssrn.3671004 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2020-01-01

In this study, we provide evidence on the deterrence effects of state tax whistleblower laws. We exploit a novel 2010 amendment to New York's False Claims Acts that explicitly extended incentives corporate income whistleblowers. identify treated firms (firms exposed FCA) using establishment-level data and descriptive analyses. Using traditional difference-in-differences design, find FCA reduced avoidance, consistent with benefits. cross-sectional tests, are increasing in grant fewer employee...

10.2139/ssrn.4207078 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2022-01-01
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