A5075568764- Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Free Will and Agency
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social and Educational Sciences
- Economic theories and models
- Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
- Economic Theory and Institutions
- Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Scientific Computing and Data Management
- Philosophy and History of Science
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Ethics in medical practice
- Research Data Management Practices
- Plant Disease Resistance and Genetics
- Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Economic Theory and Policy
- Game Theory and Applications
- Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms
- Corporate Finance and Governance
- Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Advanced Data Storage Technologies
- Multi-Criteria Decision Making
University of York
2015-2024
The University of Melbourne
2023-2024
Broad Institute
2024
Sahlgrenska University Hospital
2024
University of Gothenburg
2017-2024
The University of Texas at Austin
2022-2024
Institute for Futures Studies
2019-2023
Biocom
2023
York University
2020-2021
Swedish Defence Research Agency
2009-2015
Abstract One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option is permitted by most credible theory. In defence this principle, we argue it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying intertheoretic comparisons value, while its main rivals are either plagued analogues money pumps or in need method for making non‐arbitrary comparisons. We rebut arguments have been levelled against Theory...
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality life, there must be much larger imaginable whose existence, if other things are equal, would better, even though its members have lives that barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Abstract Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and Sadistic in population ethics. Yet Standard entails Weak Conclusion, that is, it each consisting lives at bad well-being level not worse than some good level. In this paper, I defend version does entail Conclusion. This made possible by what call ‘undistinguishedness’, fourth category absolute value addition to goodness, badness, neutrality.
Abstract In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms the other. According to definitions ‘better’, something is good if only it better than some indifference point. Against approach, that point cannot be defined without ruling out reasonable axiologies. ‘good’, approach allow for incorruptibility intrinsic goodness or breaks down cases where both relata are bad.
How do you make decisions under ignorance? That is, how decide when lack subjective probabilities for some of your options’ possible outcomes? One answer is that follow the Laplace Rule: assign an equal probability to each state nature which a (that use Principle Indifference) and then maximize expected utility. The most influential objection Rule it sensitive individuation states nature. This sensitivity problematic because seems arbitrary. In this paper, however, I argue proves too much....
Journal Article Conflicting Reasons in the Small‐Improvement Argument Get access Johan E. Gustafsson, Gustafsson Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, & Swedish Defence Research Agency Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Nicolas Espinoza The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 241, October 2010, Pages 754–763, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.648.x Published: 09 September 2009
In this article, I argue that the small-improvement fails since some of comparisons involved in argument might be indeterminate. defend view from two objections by Ruth Chang, namely phenomenology and perplexity. There are other to also hinge on claims about indeterminacy. John Broome argues alleged cases value incomparability merely examples indeterminacy betterness relation. The main premise his is much-discussed collapsing principle. offer a new counterexample principle Broome's defence...
Abstract Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms dyadic relations, ‘better’. Earlier definitions this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. claims his do not drawback. In paper, I argue do.
Optical properties of natural photonic structures can inspire material developments in diversified areas, such as the spectral design surfaces for camouflage. Here, reflectance, scattering, and polarization cuticle scarab beetle Cyphochilus insulanus are studied with directional hemispherical bidirectional reflection distribution function (BRDF) measurements, Mueller-matrix spectroscopic ellipsometry (MMSE). At normal incidence, a reflectance (0.6-0.75) is found range 400-1600 nm weaker <0.2...
The standard argument for the claim that rational preferences are transitive is pragmatic money-pump argument. However, a only exploits agents with cyclic strict preferences. In order to pump who violate transitivity but without cycle of preferences, one needs somehow induce such cycle. Methods inducing cycles from non-cyclic violations have been proposed in literature, based either on offering agent small monetary transaction premiums or multi-dimensional This paper argues previous...
Derek Parfit's argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of platitude, namely, to some future time being identical with someone who alive at time. I develop so it works on reading.
One might think that money pumps directed at agents with cyclic preferences can be avoided by foresight. This view was challenged two decades ago the discovery of a pump foresight, which works against who use backward induction. But induction implausibly assumes agent would act rationally and retain her trust in future rationality even choice nodes could only reached if she were to irrationally. worry does not apply BI-terminating decision problems, where each node prescribes move terminates...
The aim of the Consequence Argument is to show that, if determinism true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything. In stock version argument, its two premisses state that (i) is, was, able act so past would have been different and (ii) laws nature different. This fails, however, because it requires an invalid inference rule. standard response strengthen both by replacing 'would' with 'might'. While this ensures validity, weakens since strengthens premisses. I we can do better: We...
This version of the Difference Principle mirrors maximin structure Maximin Equity Criterion, according to which a first distribution is socially at least as good