We consider the pricing problem faced by a revenue-maximizing platform matching price-sensitive customers to flexible supply units within geographic area. This can be interpreted as in short term ride-hailing platform. propose two-dimensional framework which selects prices for different locations and drivers respond choosing where relocate, equilibrium, based on prices, travel costs, driver congestion levels. The platform’s is an infinite-dimensional optimization with equilibrium...

We study the relationship between capacity and performance for a service firm with spatial operations, in sense that requests arrive origin-destination pairs. An example of such system is ride-hailing platform which each customer arrives need to travel from an origin destination. propose parsimonious representation multiserver through state-dependent queueing model captures frictions as well economies scale rate. In classical [Formula: see text] model, square root safety (SRS) staffing rule...

Once autonomous vehicles (AVs) are deployed for ride-hailing platforms, human drivers will compete with AVs until AV costs decrease enough to eliminate entirely. We examine a platform’s strategy recruit while operating private fleet. Using game-theoretic model, we analyze how the platform sets human-driver wage and size of its show that setting higher can surprisingly lead less participation. Moreover, having option augment fleet after observing participation levels can, counterintuitively,...

We consider the pricing problem faced by a revenue maximizing platform matching price-sensitive customers to flexible supply units within geographic area. This can be interpreted as in short-term ride-hailing platform. propose two-dimensional framework which selects prices for different locations, and drivers respond choosing where relocate equilibrium based on prices, travel costs driver congestion levels.The platform's is an infinite-dimensional optimization with constraints. elucidate...

We study the relationship between capacity and performance for a service firm with spatial operations, in sense that requests arrive origin-destination pairs. An example of such system is ride-hailing platform which each customer arrives need to travel from an origin destination. propose state-dependent queueing model captures frictions as well economies scale through rate. In classical M/M/n model, square root safety (SRS) staffing rule known balance server utilization wait times. By...

We analyze an optimal electric vehicle (EV) fleet and charging infrastructure capacity planning problem in a spatial setting. As customer requests arrive at rate λ, the system operator must determine minimum number of vehicles chargers for given service level along with matching policy that maximizes level. provide sharp characterization size requirements as demand grows. While which times are negligible needs extra Θ(λ^(2/3)) on top nominal capacity, we show EV has fundamentally different...

Motivated in part by online marketplaces such as ridesharing and freelancing platforms, we study two-sided matching markets where agents are heterogeneous their compatibility with different types of jobs: flexible can fulfill any job, whereas each specialized agent only be matched to a specific subset jobs. When the set jobs compatible is known, full-information first-best throughput (i.e. number matches) achieved prioritizing dispatch much possible. strategic, however, show that aggressive...

We study the matching of jobs to workers waiting in a queue, for example ridesharing platform dispatching drivers pick up riders at an airport. Under FIFO dispatching, heterogeneity earnings from different trips incentivizes cherrypick, increasing riders' times match, and resulting poor reliability riders, low average drivers, loss throughput revenue platform. Simple fixes by limiting transparency or drivers' flexibility are neither desirable nor fully effective. Optimal origin-destination...

Nonprofit fundraising websites often display a set of default donation amounts, allowing prospective donors to effortlessly select an amount from this "default menu" instead manually inputting their ideal donation. Although menus are effective at shaping behavior, strategy can backfire: defaults attract with both lower and higher donations, potentially leading net decrease in revenue. To address challenge, we present comprehensive framework for designing menu maximize revenue the presence...

An assumption that is pervasive in revenue management and economics buyers are perfect optimizers. However, practice, may be limited by their computational capabilities or lack of information not able to perfectly optimize response a selling mechanism. This has motivated the introduction approximate incentive compatibility as solution concept for practical mechanisms. In “Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility,” Balseiro, Besbes, Castro study, first time, problem...

This paper studies how the potential introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in a fleet human drivers (HVs) may impact quality service and equality access to transportation on ride-hailing platforms. We formulate game-theoretical queueing model which platform aims maximize its profit while HVs make strategic joining decisions. Our results demonstrate that AVs deteriorate level. As incorporates AVs, it prioritize them, affects earnings drives them out market. then reveal reduction level is...

We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus seller is required to satisfy buyers' A leading example online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and instead transaction-contingent fees.

We characterize the steady-state queue length distribution for Power-of-d choices routing algorithm almost all values of d in sub-Halfin Whitt asymptotic regime.

We study the relationship between capacity and performance for a service firm with spatial operations, in sense that requests arrive origin-destination pairs. An example of such system is ride-hailing platform which each customer arrives need to travel from an origin destination. propose state-dependent queueing model captures frictions as well economies scale through rate. In classical M/M/n model, square root safety (SRS) staffing rule known balance server utilization wait times. By...

We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus seller is required to satisfy buyers’ A leading example online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and instead transaction-contingent fees.

We study how a profit-maximizing firm prioritizes its supply in “hybrid marketplace” composed of both private and flexible agents. The can choose many agents to operate pays them regardless their work. Flexible agents, on the other hand, make own revenue, pay commission rate firm, enter or exit marketplace equilibrium. develop general framework for prioritization that encompasses wide range applications—including any operating with mix employees (private agents) contractors (flexible...

We study the classic sequential screening problem under ex-post participation constraints. Thus seller is required to satisfy buyers’ A leading example online display advertising market, in which publishers frequently cannot use up-front fees and instead transaction-contingent fees.

We study the classic sequential screening problem in presence of buyers’ ex-post participation constraints. A leading example is online display advertising market, which publishers frequently do not use up-front fees and instead transaction-contingent fees. establish conditions under optimal selling mechanism static buyers are screened with respect to their interim type, or type. In particular, we provide an intuitive necessary sufficient condition contract for general distributions values....

We study the classic sequential screening problem in presence of ex-post participation constraints. establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine exhaustively when optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In contract, buyers are not screened with respect to their interim type object sold at a posted price. menu quantities offered. completely characterize contract binary types continuum values. Importantly, randomizes allocation low buyer while giving...

When working with generative artificial intelligence (AI), users may see productivity gains, but the AI-generated content not match their preferences exactly. To study this effect, we introduce a Bayesian framework in which heterogeneous choose how much information to share AI, facing trade-off between output fidelity and communication cost. We show that interplay these individual-level decisions AI training lead societal challenges. Outputs become more homogenized, especially when is...